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1. ABSTRACT
This thesis presents Argentina as a "trade bridge" to Mercosur. It was on March 26, 1991
that Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the agreement to enlarge their
domestic markets through economic integration.
The concept of "trade bridge" depicts Argentina as a potential link for American firms
seeking to invest in and trade with the rest of the Mercosur nations. Argentina can be the
principal gateway into these other emerging markets and establish the first means by
which this expansion can take place. This thesis attempts to answer key questions such
as:
1. Is Argentina more suitable for trade with US companies than the other Mercosur
countries? and if so, why?
2. Which US industries will benefit? How will specific industry participation affect
Argentine-US trade and overall investment flows?
3. How can American companies benefit from trade and investment with Argentina,
and through Argentina, trading with Mercosur countries?
As the countries within Mercosur consolidate their respective programs of modernization,
regional economic integration will move forward even more rapidly, since the existence

of Mercosur will indeed ease the coordination of trade, exchange rate, fiscal, credit, and
other macro-economic and sectoral policies. (Carlsson, 1997)
Within Mercosur, Argentina has not only reversed the poor economic performance
evident during the past ten years, but during the 1990's its economic improvement has
been of the most successful of Western nations. (Campbell, 1997).
Trade patterns and foreign investments volume has increased dramatically as a result of
improved economic conditions, legislation reforms and privatization efforts. After Brazil,
the US represents the most important trade partner for Argentina. Since 1989 activity
between the two nations has evolved into a dynamic exchange of goods and services. The
most notable evidence of this, are the increased establishments of operations by top
American companies in Argentina. Another notable example are the innumerable
privatization projects in which US firms have so far dominated.
There are vast opportunities in distinct industries including food, chemicals, automotive,
mining, communications, petroleum and natural gas, computer services, insurance and
banking, hotels and supermarkets.
The greatest opportunity for US firms exists in the technology-service industry including
automation through computers, networking devices and other telecommunication
products. Argentina represents a growing market which possesses a population whose
purchasing power and consumer needs are increasing at record pace. It is necessary for
these firms to realize the potential "link" that Argentina can establish for future expansion
into the other Mercosur nations.
Argentina as a "trade bridge" will link these US companies to a region of vast economic
growth and wondrous opportunities in terns of market size, future prospects in trade and
investment and sustainable growing trends.

2. INTRODUCTION
Globalization of the world economy, enhancement of free trade frontiers together with
the reduction of customs tariffs and the creation of a new organization known as the
World Trade Organization (WTO: which is widely empowered to enforce international
treaties) are extremely important aspects of today's global trade trends. These collectively
reveal that the recent economic growth of countries is closely related to trade
dynamization and expansion within increasingly wider geographic areas. ( HerreraVegas, 1996).
Perhaps the most recent example of this has been last April 19th's Summit Meeting of
The Americas in the city of Santiago, Chile. It was there that leaders of 34 countries in
the Western Hemisphere took a first step toward creating the world's largest free trade
zone, one that would span then Americas. In a joint declaration signed by President

Clinton and 21 other presidents and 12 prime ministers, the leaders said that talks on the
subject would begin in September and they pledged to make "Concrete progress" toward
a goal of signing an agreement by 2005. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
would have 34 member nations (Cuba is not included) with 750 million people and a
gross domestic product of more than US$ 9 Trillion. The United States accounts for 85%
of the region's economy. (Sims, 1998).
The important advances made in these trade expansion and integration agreements
suggest that they are not only a necessity for growth, but also that isolation may threaten
the subsistence of those nations that do not succeed in finding their way to enter these
processes of trade frontier enhancements. (Hoopes, 1996)
Regional integration and participation in trade agreements is usually based on the
reciprocal extension of trade privileges and as such these agreements serve to lower
tariffs, eliminate quota restrictions, or otherwise remove protectionist barriers to crossborder trade between nationals of member countries. Global and regional trade
agreements may contribute significantly to future prosperity and freedom of world
markets and it is in this way that regional integration represents a crucial element for
economic growth (de la Balze, 1996)
A most notable example of this is Argentina's current trade policy and how thoroughly it
embraces the notion of free markets. To encourage foreign investment and open
Argentina's markets to the forces of competition, the administration in power since 1989
has employed unilateral market liberalization and stabilization measures in combination
with multinational and regional trade agreements like Mercosur. Such liberalization
measures have boosted production and caused the domestic economy to expand greatly.
In an effort to encourage export opportunities, the country has aggressively pursued
membership in such agreements (Borner, 1994).
Regional Economic Integration
The processes of economic regional integration that have developed or are being
developed in the world, may be classified according to their higher or lower degree of
integration. (Cateora, 1996).
They are as follows:
1. Free Trade Zone (or FTZ): To facilitate export trade, countries designate areas
within their borders as customs-privileged areas where manufacturers can assemble their
products without paying tariffs on the imported parts until they enter a country and are
for sale. Some countries designate a factory or a warehouse where goods can be stored or
assembled; others designate an entire area as an FTZ.
2. Free Trade Area (or FTA): It is an agreement between two or more nations to reduce
or eliminate customs duties and non-tariff trade barriers among partner countries while
members maintain individual tariff schedules for external countries. It provides its

members with a "mass market" without barriers that impede the flow of goods and
services. (Ex: NAFTA)
3. Customs Union: It represents the next stage in economic cooperation. It enjoys the
free-trade areas' reduced or eliminated internal tariffs and adds a common external tariff
on products imported from countries outside the union. The Customs Union (as is
Mercosur) is a logical step in the transition
4. Common Market: It eliminates all tariffs and o ther restrictions on internal trade,
adopts a set of common external tariffs, and removes all restriction on the free flow of
capital and labor among member nations. It is a "unified economy", but lacks "political
unity" to become a Political Union (Economic Union)
5. Economic Union: This represents the most fully integrated form of regional
cooperation. It involves complete political and economic integration; it may voluntary or
enforced. At its ideal point it may involve the free flow between borders of all factors of
productions (such as where the EU is evolving into). Another example is The
Commonwealth of Nations which represents the loosest possible, voluntary relationship
that can be classified as economic integration.
There is no question that during the last 15 years a new trend towards globalization of the
economy has emerged world wide. Examples of the new trend include NAFTA, EU,
APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation), and of course Mercosur. It was on March
26, 1991 that Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the agreement to enlarge
their domestic markets through this economic integration. Mercosur is the most recent
regional trade agreement which certainly appears to be drawing increasing attention from
world investors. It represents an unavoidable actor in the field of global commerce and
economy (Hoopes, 1996). Mercosur has evolved into the 4th largest economic group in
the world and the second largest Customs Union after the EU.

Table 1
ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF THE MAJOR TRADING BLOCS
GDP ($Trillion) POPULATION GDP Per Capita EXPORTS ($Billion)

NAFTA
EU
PACIFIC RIM *
MERCOSUR

7.5
7.2
5.8
0.8

378
364
470
204

19988
19781
12279
4327

712
1651
973
62

* Comprised of Japan, Korea, Hong-Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.

It is interesting to note that the members of NAFTA and Mercosur are the principal
economic players of the Western Hemisphere. Combined they represent 96 percent of the
hemisphere's total GDP. The importance of Mercosur for the United States is reflected by
the fact that more than 55 percent of its exports to South America are currently
concentrated in the four Mercosur countries, and 65 percent of the United States' foreign
direct investment in South America is in the Mercosur member nations. (Carlsson, 1997)

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Argentina represents a positive business environment for firms through its market based
economy, its favorable legal framework for investments, its efficient service
infrastructure and its highly skilled human resources. For these reasons I will examine the
role of Argentina within Mercosur and determine whether and how US firms can take
advantage of this in terms of both investment and trade.
Argentina represents a "trade bridge" into Mercosur through its currently favorable socioeconomic climate of growth and long-term stability. There are several industries which
present great investment opportunities for American firms wishing to invest capital as
well as those companies wishing to engage in exporting, joint ventures or other means of
market penetration.
In order to illustrate the gateway that Argentina represents for US firms seeking to invest
and engage in trade within Mercosur I examine several critical questions in this thesis.
The first set of these, concerning Argentina's basic economic conditions, are:




How has Mercosur affected Argentina's economic growth?
In which of the nation's economic variables is this growth most evident?
Haw has this apparent "trade and investment drive" accelerated Argentine
economic recovery?

In order to answer these questions in depth, I analyzed Argentina's basic economic
indicators conducting a Pre-Post study (1987-1997) of the figures prior to Mercosur's
existence and after its signing into effect. I compare the changes in the major indicators
before Mercosur and then the indicators following a few years after Mercosur. This will
indicate the nature and degree of influence the regional agreement had on the nation's
overall economic and trade environment.
Most of the figures researched are from The UN Statistical Abstract of the World (Third
Edition) and the Statistical Yearbook (40th issue), recent publications, and current
newspaper articles on the subject from The Wall Street Journal, New York Times,
Business Week, Latin Trade, Financial Times, and some Argentine publications
including Clarin and La Nacion.

The general economic variables I study are:
Economy:
1) Real GDP

7) Average Exchange
Rate

2) Fiscal Balance Ratio

8) GDP Per Capita

3) Foreign Exchange Reserves 9) Unemployment Rate
4) GDP Growth Rate

10) Foreign Debt

5) Inflation (% year end)

11) Consumption

6) Foreign Debt

12) Investment (domestic)

These economic indicators are closely observed to determine each one's behavior as a
result of Mercosur's creation and I will attempt to measure the observable impact of
Mercosur on them individually and then the impact on them within the framework of the
whole economy.
Clearly, during 1995 and 1996, the economy has been accomplishing the principal
criteria for sustained growth. (Fidler, 1997). It is interesting to dissect the major sectors
of the economic environment to determine what the results have been and what future
prospects can be predicted through trend analysis. For example, even though the nation's
economy has flourished under the new stabilization, unemployment rates have not
decreased dramatically and this represents a major area of concern for the nation's people.
My objective is to examine these variables and closely study the current situation and
how it all relates to Argentina's performance and participation within the framework of
Mercosur.
Trade:
1) US Exports (FAS $ million)
2) US Imports (C. V $ million)
3) Total Country Exports (FOB $ million)
4) Total Country Imports (CIF $ million)
5) Trade Balance ($ million)
After running a strong deficit in 1994, Argentina's trade balance moved solidly into
surplus after the first quarter of 1995 as exports climbed sharply and imports declined
slightly. The development of trade with Brazil under the protection of Mercosur has
become an important element of Argentina's trade strategy. Mercosur is viewed as "the
most effective" tool Argentina has to promote long-term economic growth. For example,
in the agricultural sector alone, Argentina ran a US$1.3 billion surplus in its trade with
the other three Mercosur members. (Decker, 1997). I will examine impacts and results
such as these for the major sectors of the economy.

I also describe the changes in the flow of investment before and after the implementation
of Mercosur in 1991. It is important to note that as a result of the development of
Mercosur, there has been not only a dramatic increase in trade, but also an even greater
increase in the flow of foreign investment into the country. (Diaz, 1996).
In addition, I examine the trade impact both within the Mercosur (intra-regional trade)
and between Argentina and other non-member nations paying particular attention to the
United States, Japan, the EU nations, and other Latin American countries which are not
currently Mercosur members. I compare the Argentine export and import figures and
break the numbers down into total Argentine imports and exports to Mercosur, USA, EU
and other countries (subdivided into Japan, Mexico, Canada, and other Latin American
nations.

My contribution determines the reasons for these recent increases in trade activity and
foreign investment. Most importantly I quantify Mercosur's observable impact on these
recent developments.
-Does Argentina's membership in Mercosur guarantee the nation more active
investment sectors? And if yes, why and how much?
• Is Argentina indeed more suitable for trade with American firms than other
Mercosur nations?
-What are the Selection Criteria ?
Asking this question and attempting to answer it implicitly gives the notion that despite
Mercosur (tending towards a market) each country is distinct as a trading partner and that
a US firm, despite economic advantages offered by the region, common should focus on
a single country to achieve greater results.
The question should be looked at from the point of view of a comparative analysis
between the member nations. What socio-economic characteristics does Argentina have
that the other member nations lack?
A comparison across the four nations (paying attention at basic data, historical
background, as well recent trends in their business climates) enables the analysis of the
information and interpretation of the reasons why Argentina presently represents the
strongest market in terms of size, purchasing power, educational attainment and sociopolitical stability.
• What Are The Present Investment and Trade Opportunities Available for US
Firms in Argentina?
-Which industries and sectors of the economy (products, services)?
-Privatization involving US firms' capital investments?

• How can these American firms take advantage of the opportunities in Argentina to
trade and invest in other member nations?
To answer these questions I examine the current conditions existing in Argentina (within
the framework of Mercosur) and what opportunities exist for American firms wishing to
export there, make a foreign direct investment and some other form of market entry or
invest intense capital or even engage in other means of market penetration (such as:
strategic alliances, and other licensing agreements).
Indeed, the reduction --if not the removal-- of non tariff restrictions (through Mercosur)
on the import of consumer goods has opened up the market to imports and increased the
sales of many products. (Hinkelman, 1996). Improved economic conditions are
increasing consumers' discretionary income. Since 1993 the demand for imported goods
has slowed somewhat following the initial boom period in February of 1991, but a
moderate to very strong demand continues to exist virtually across the board for capital,
intermediate and consumer goods. In addition, even when domestic industries are filling
most of the current demand in their particular markets, they are increasingly relying on
imported materials and components, as well as on capital goods, creating additional
markets for foreign suppliers. (Hinkelman, 1996).
I establish the particular industries in which both export and import opportunities exist
for US firms and examine the future prospects in the coming few years and how
Mercosur's growth will affect this. Some of the industries are: aerospace, computers and
software, construction materials, electricity, industrial equipment, medical and scientific
equipment, motor vehicles and vehicle parts, and telecommunications. These specific
industries were selected as they are the sectors in which great opportunities for growth
exist and where US firms can achieve the highest benefits if they decide to engage in
trade in the above areas.
There have been many reasons for the current foreign investment boom in Argentina
including new legislation (Argentine Foreign Investment Act of 1993), and political,
social and economic stability. FDI continues its heated pace ever since the signing of
Mercosur, remaining strong in the last few years. Cumulative, recorded, direct, non
financial inflows of foreign investment (investments other than portfolio investment
placed in securities that can be liquidated the initial boom period in February of 1991, but
a moderate to very strong demand continues to exist virtually across the board for capital,
intermediate and consumer goods. In addition, even when domestic industries are filling
most of the current demand in their particular markets, they are increasingly relying on
imported materials and components, as well as on capital goods, creating additional
markets for foreign suppliers.(Hinkelman, 1996).
I establish the particular industries in which both export and import opportunities exist
for US firms and examine the future prospects in the coming few years and how
Mercosur's growth will affect this. Some of the industries are: aerospace, computers and
software, construction materials, electricity, industrial equipment, medical and scientific
equipment, motor vehicles and vehicle parts, and telecommunications. These specific

industries were selected as they are the sectors in which great opportunities for growth
exist and where US firms can achieve the highest benefits if they decide to engage in
trade in the above areas.
There have been many reasons for the current foreign investment boom in Argentina
including new legislation (Argentine Foreign Investment Act of 1993), and political,
social and economic stability. FDI continues its heated pace ever since the signing of
Mercosur, remaining strong in the last few years. Cumulative, recorded, direct, non
financial inflows of foreign investment (investments other than portfolio investment
placed in securities that can be liquidated rapidly --the so called "hot money") in
Argentina as of year end 1993 amounted to approximately US$ 28 billion between 199093; the third largest inflow among emerging markets worldwide. (Hinkelman, 1996)
Private capital inflow in 1992 almost reached US$ 8 billion and was slightly more than
US$5 billion for 1993. With privatization largely completed, the massive capital inflows
of the early 1990's are expected to subside somewhat. However, assuming continued
growth and stability, foreign investment should remain in a surplus position for the
remainder of the decade, although observers expect annual flows to level off at figure
around US$ 2 billion (Hoopes, 1996)
I examine FDI's past history in Argentina and the trends that were evident prior to
Mercosur (perhaps dating back to 1987) and then compare with the current booming
situation in Argentina. I explain the extent of Mercosur's impact on the changes in FDI
patterns in Argentina in the last five to ten years.
I collect both historical data as well as administering a mail survey/ questionnaire to
managers of major US firms based in Argentina. Companies to be surveyed include:
General Motors, Lockheed Aircrafts, Lone Star Industries, NL Industries, telecom
Ventures, Unisys, Nortel, Mattel, just to name a few.
The above were selected because they are the particular ones in which American firms
have a substantial direct capital investment and which have been identified by the parent
firm as a wholly or partially owned subsidiary, affiliate, or branch. Franchises,
representatives and non-commercial enterprises or institutions, such as hospitals, schools,
etc. financed or operated by American philanthropic or religious organizations are not
included.
The primary source of primary data is the mail surveys / questionnaires completed by the
parent corporations and annual reports provided by them. Direct telephone contact and
personal interviews will be used extensively for verification and clarification of the
functions of subsidiaries in Argentina. Ideally, the personal interview will be a follow-up
to the completed mail questionnaire in order to clarify major points of interest not
covered previously.

Questionnaire Design (Please refer to Appendix C for a sample of the questionnaire;
PDF file 167 KB)
Questionnaire consists of 26 detailed questions (open ended, multiple choice, and rating
through scales) covering numerous aspects of the firm's operations in Argentina:
Questions 1-5: cover the location of operations (what major cities), date of establishment
in Argentina, the particular industry in which the company competes, the relationship
with the US headquarters, and the reasons why the company decided to take operations to
Argentina.
Questions 6-8: ask about the current business climate in the Argentine operations such as
whether there has been recent expansion or contraction and the reasons why, ratings of
firm's performance in comparison to worldwide operations, competitive strength within
local industry.
Questions 9-11: introduces Mercosur within framework of the company's operations in
Argentina. These questions ask about Mercosur's influence on operations, its potential
strengths and weaknesses as it relates to the particular industry in which the firm is
competing.
Questions 12-16: ask about Argentina's overall economic and business environment,
focusing on the factors that have led to US companies' success or lack of success in the
country. The firm is asked to respond to a series of scale-design questions as to whether
they agree or not agree with statements regarding privatization efforts and the conditions
existing for such projects.
Questions 17-18: focus on Argentina's restructured legal framework. Companies are
asked to rate the level of influence of this new legislation on their level of investment
within the past years and the overall impact it has or no has had on the firm and industry
as a whole.
Questions 19-21: describe the future outlook of the company's operations in Argentina as
well as the possibilities for movement into neighboring Mercosur nations (Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay). Respondents are also asked to describe the most dramatic
changes that the firm has experienced as a result of Mercosur's implementation.
Questions 22-26: illustrate the company's future strategic plans as Mercosur eventually
grows into a true common market (both long term and short term prospects and goals).
Respondents are also asked to point out their most important competitive advantages and
benefits derived from having established operations in Argentina and other comments
and opinions they may have regarding the subject.

• What has been the social impact of the economic reform in Argentina?
- in particular, relating to the major socio-demographic segments of the population?
- How has Mercosur contributed to the overall social climate?
In my research I address the impact that Argentina's economic advance has had on
Argentine society as a whole. I undertake a closer analysis of population perceptions,
attitudes, and opinions on the reforms undertaken, privatization efforts as well as
Mercosur itself. This will enable a better in depth look into the trade agreements role
within the dynamically evolving Argentine economy.
What this question poses is the issue of the current economic reforms' impact on
employment rates, consumer spending, education levels and the country's literacy rate.
By comparing the major trends existing today in Argentina and those figures prior to
1989 (beginning of the economic restructuring period) I can infer the effects (both the
positive and the negative) evident in the lives of the Argentine population
Another aspect of the "social implications" on the agreement which cannot be quantified,
but are indeed observed and studied, are the general attitude changes and reactions of the
people: How they feel about the economic reforms and Mercosur and how the
implementation of these has benefited them in their everyday life, and how it has altered
their perspective on the current economic situation of the country. In order to achieve
this, I conduct an examination of the recent polls in the last elections, recent articles and
publications in both American and US magazines and newspapers.
• What have been the recent criticisms on Mercosur?
- Counter arguments?
-What is Trade Diversion vs. Trade Creation?
• Has Mercosur erected barriers to foreign (non- Mercosur) competition?
Here I analyze the views presented in a very stimulating and well-publicized academic
critique on the South Cone Common Market (Mercosur). I discuss and interpret perhaps
the strongest case written against Mercosur and attempt to refute each point made by the
author: Alexander J. Yeats (the principal economist from the International Trade Division
of the World Bank, Washington DC).
By gathering supporting data I summarize my findings on the agreement and enhance its
benefits while at the same time counter-arguing Mr. Yeat's attempts to undermine all that
Mercosur has achieved. I focus on his "key points of attack". It is essential to define the
concepts presented and what exactly is mean by "trade diversion" and "trade creation".
Also, of great importance is measuring the extent of the influence that this criticism may
have no future investment and trade between Mercosur nations and the rest of the world.
During the last decade, the formation and development of Mercosur have undoubtedly
been two of the main achievements of Argentina and its partners in a process largely
exceeding the "mere" economic and business arena. Overcoming chronic difficulties and

leaving historical regional antagonism behind, around 1985 the nations of the region took
up an ambitious challenge.
Contrary to many predictions, Mercosur has punctually and strictly complied with each
and every schedule agreed. It has even grown to include some new "associate members"
such as Chile and Bolivia (which was discussed earlier on in the proposal).
In concrete terms, the marked increase in Argentine participation in international trade
has been accompanied by significant growth in "world" trade with the country, not only
for other Mercosur nations, but also for external economies, such as East Asian countries,
the United States and the European Union. But is it all as it seems?
In other words, is it clear that as a consequence of the creation of Mercosur, trade
volume generated is higher than trade diverted?
How will American firms seeking to become involved in substantial trade with the
Mercosur bloc benefit greatly from viewing Argentina as this "trade bridge"?
In my research I answer the questions above and prove that regional integration
agreements are not means of protecting members, rather they are a means of liberalizing
trade worldwide and enhancing the emergence of global, interdependent economies.

4. A CLOSER LOOK AT MERCOSUR
Latin America is widely considered the fastest growing area of the world (alongside
South East Asia) and within it, Mercosur is the fastest growing region representing a
single market of 230 million people; more than 58 percent of Latin America's GDP; 59
percent of its total area; slightly more than 51 percent of its industrial production and
inter-regional trade and 33% of total Latin American foreign trade. 'Mercosur will
develop faster in the next few years than NAFTA," predicted former US Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger at a meeting of the Latin America Business Council last year.
(Silva, 1997)
Combined GDP of its member nations (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil) is just
below US$ 900 million. Its total trade (exports plus imports) reached 124.4 billion dollars
in 1995. In other words, Mercosur is an integrated market which accounts for more than
half the value of Latin America's main economic indicators, and has an unmistakable
potential and drawing power.

Table 2
MERCOSUR IN NUMBERS 1996
COUNTRY

AREA (mill. miles 2) (mill) REAL GDP ($ bn.)

ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
PARAGUAY
URUGUAY
TOTAL (Mercosur Nations)
UNITED STATES

1.08
3.28
0.15
0.07
4.58
3.78

34.1
162.2
4.7
3.3
204.3
260

279.4
581.3
7.6
15.6
883.9
4885

Source: Hinkelman, 1996.
Judging by recent developments, the integration process in Mercosur has made enormous
strides and has reached a level of interrelationship that provides a solid foundation for
future, additional progress. (Herrera-Vegas,1996). Mercosur has created an impressively
dynamic market of US$ 1 trillion. This dynamism is based primarily on bilateral trade
between the two largest economies of South America, Brazil and Argentina. From 1990
to 1994, trade among Mercosur economies of South America, Brazil and Argentina.
From 1990 to 1994, trade among Mercosur countries increased by 181 percent (roughly
30 percent per year) (Hinkelman, 1996). Without a doubt Mercosur's greatest impact has
been the extraordinary growth in trade and investment among the member nations.

Figure 1
MERCOSUR INTRAREGIONAL TRADE
1981-1997

Source: The Economist, 1998
As shown in the graph above, intra-regional trade (within member nations) increased
dramatically after 1991, the time around which Mercosur took an important role in the
region's trade patterns. It must be pointed out that the larger figures have been the result
of the two larger nations: Argentina and Brazil. Estimated total trade at mid 1997 was
US$ 17 million and projected numbers for 1998 may reach the 20 million mark. (Warn,
1998). However, "intra-regional" trade has not been the only area in which great
increases have taken place. Interestingly enough, Mercosur's overall "global trade" in

1996 increased approximately 43,5% over the 1995 figures. Total trade (exports +
imports) reached US$ 135 billion in 1996.

Figure 2
MERCOSUR GLOBAL TRADE
1996

Source: Bannister, 1997
If one takes a closer look at how this global trade pattern is broken down among the
different areas of the world, we see that United States is the number one trade partner of
the Mercosur nations collectively. Even though, the EU has a greater amount as a whole
entity, none of the other individual nations in the world come close to the US- Mercosur
Trade numbers.

Figure 3
MERCOSUR GLOBAL TRADE
1996 (Segmented into regions)

Source: Ministry of Economy Report, 1997

Table 3
MERCOSUR GLOBAL TRADE
United States

20% 27 US$ Billion (rounded off from 26.8)

European Union

40% 54 US$ Billion

Great Britain

12% 6.48 US$ Billion

Germany

10% 5.4 US$ Billion

France

9% 4.86 US$ Billion

Italy

6% 3.24 US$ Billion

Spain

3% 1.62 US$ Billion

Other Latin American nations

15% 20.25 US$ Billion

Asian NICs

13% 17.55 US$ Billion

Japan

5% 6.75 US$ Billion

Rest of World

7% 9.45 US$ Billion

TOTAL

100% 135 US$ Billion

Source: Ministry of Economy Report, 1997

Table 4
MERCOSUR'S TRADE WITH U.S
(Mercosur's exports and imports to the U.S)
(Billion Dollars)

1995

1996

EXPORTS

13.7

16

IMPORTS

10.7

10.8

TOTAL

24.4

26.8

BALANCE

plus 3

plus 5.2

Ministry of Economy Report: 1997
Note: Mercosur is the 8th largest export market in the world and the 12th largest supplier
overall.

What is worth mentioning from the US perspective is that eighty percent of the major
American companies in Latin America are settled in Mercosur and even though the
principal trade and investment partner is by far the EU (with which Mercosur has a
"bilateral trade agreement"), the US represents the most important individual country in
terms of trade volume with Mercosur.
An older agreement with the United States called the "Four Plus One" has grown
substantially in the last five years. Also referred to as "The Rose Garden", "Four Plus
One" agreements was originally signed in 1991 to provide the US and Mercosur members
with a structures within which to negotiate reciprocal trade and investment arrangements.
Specifically, it provides the US with the means to negotiate with Mercosur members
collectively rather than having to negotiate with each country individually, while it also
allows the members of Mercosur to speak with a more powerful united voice.
(Hinkelman, 1996)
It is in this south American region that the US companies will have the greatest
opportunities for both investment and wider trade relations. (Campbell, 1998)
Mercosur's long term goals are as follows:
* Harmonization of legislation, tax structure, commercial practices, tariff structure, and
standards for quality and production.
* Disappearance of protection for certain companies, subsidies, monopolies and market
shares.
* Increase of market potential, competition, employment, productivity, consumer
demands, regional enterprise initiations and extra-territory investment flows.
The agreement will allow for free movement of goods, services, and factors of production
(including capital, labor and natural resources) among member countries upon fulfillment
of the long-term goals of the agreement. Currently it establishes a CET (Common
External Tariff) to third countries. Mercosur's governing body is the Common Market
Council, composed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economy of each member
state. The Executive Body of Mercosur is the Common Market Group composed of
sixteen members representing Ministers of Foreign Affairs; of Economy and Central
Banks. The Common Market Group has a permanent Secretariat based in Montevideo
(Uruguay) and eleven working groups dealing with sectarian policies. The Mercosur
Trade Commission overlooks the implementation of the CET and Mercosur Trade Policy.
(Decker, 1997)

It is imperative to point out that Mercosur is still far from being a "true common market",
but the members have managed to achieve a customs union and continue negotiations
aimed at full common market status by 2006.

The current priorities of Mercosur are as follows: first, to maintain what was already
arranged; second, to deepen the agreements in terms of new economic sectors, third: to
advance in the external front at a regional level; and fourth to participate in hemispheric
and international initiatives with similar regional trade markets.
To maintain the agreements already obtained is a daily exercise. Frequently new
restrictions appear that have to be discussed and overcome. This appears to reflect that
increasing commerce and at greater trade volume can lead to a greater quantity of
possible conflicts.
Originally, in the case of Mercosur, a period of transition was established, as from the
date of the execution of the agreement (December 31st 1994), in which the member
countries set up a Program of Trade Liberalization, whereby tariffs levied on trade within
the bloc would be linearly and automatically reduced. In this way, as of December 31,
1994, all goods that originated in Mercosur would be free from tariffs with nontariff restrictions upon them, and presumably if they were traded within Mercosur.
In practice, the first stage of economic integration was an imperfect free trade
association. The four countries made lists of goods, which were not affected by tariff
preferences because they were being considered sensitive to competition. Year by year,
those lists were reduced and, on January 1, 1995 a 100 percent of liberalization was
obtained for the whole universe of tariffs that affected the goods originated in Mercosur.
The only exception was a list of products filed by each country within the system of final
adequacy to customs union (Decker, 1997)
The concepts of inter-zone and extra-zone trade must be differentiated to distinguish the
first stage of trade liberalization from the second. Inter-zone trade means trade
developed exclusively within the limits of the bloc, that is to say, trade which involves
the member countries only. On the other hand, Extra-Zone trade refers to that between
the bloc and the rest of the world, that is to say, commercial transactions performed
between any of the member countries and the rest of the world (Carlsson, 1997)

Therefore, the first stage of integration, the free trade association, involved only interzone trade, without affecting the tariff level that each country in the Mercosur maintains
with the rest of the world. In order to reach the Customs Union stage in Mercosur as of
1995, each of the member countries had to replace their own particular tariff structure.
An extra-zone common tariff structure was adopted by the four countries, which meant
that the protection level upon the imports from the rest of the world would be the same
for all the countries in the Mercosur. The existence of a CET (Common External Tariff
would prevent leakage of products that could be imported through the country that
offered the lower tariff protection, this becoming a place for goods in transit to be sent to
a further destination.

During 1994, a variety of events took place which led to greater regional economic
integration across the world. On January 1, NAFTA (North American Free Trade
Agreement) signed by Mexico, US and Canada was put into force. Also, the agreements
reached by the Summit of Presidents -held in Miami on December 1994- which put
negotiations into motion to set up a continental free trade zone in the year 2005,
represented a new step towards Inter-American integration.
A regional undertaking of major importance blossomed in 1994: the leaders of the main
countries adjacent to the Pacific Ocean created APEC (Asian Pacific Economic
Cooperation). This group included several economically powerful countries led by the
US, Japan and China. In South America, the process of Mercosur was consolidated by
the agreements reached in Ouro Preto on December 1994, which ensured the enforcement
of a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and a Customs Union among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay as of January 1, 1995.
Although this is a matter of considerable debate, "regional agreements" (like NAFTA,
and Mercosur) generally are not devised to foster internal free trade on the one hand and
protectionism towards the rest of the world on the other. On the contrary, agreements
among blocs tend to be achieved, which then accelerate the globalization of the world
trade. In other words, "open" regionalism may be understood as a "non-multilateral"
means of advancing towards a more open international trade system. (Ribeiro, 1997)

Basically, this view of regionalism may be construed as an integration process which
neither builds walls nor intends to become a fortress, isolated from the rest of the world.
This is the concept which inspired the "founders" of Mercosur and continues to inspire
those concerned with its further development. (Decker, 1997)
A clear indication of this is the fact that only eighteen months after the setting up of the
Customs Union, Mercosur concluded its first NonMercosur free trade agreement, in this
case with Chile. This country and Bolivia have since signed free trade association
agreements with Mercosur. Negotiations aimed at achieving a similar agreement with the
Andean Pact countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) will soon follow. Mercosur
is also participating as a bloc in the Free Trade Area of the Americas hemispheric
integration negotiations (FTAA).
In a very significant step, on December 22nd 1994 a Joint Declaration between the EU
Council and the Mercosur member countries was made known, in which the interest in
establishing an inter-regional political and economic association was remarked. Two
negotiations carried out in September, in Brussels, and in October, in Montevideo, ended
up with the signing in Madrid on December 15th 1995, of the inter-regional Framework
Agreement of Cooperation between the EU and Mercosur. This model for negotiation of
a trade pact became this way the first agreement entered into by two regional systems of
integration, opening doors to the future creation of an economic space with 580 million
consumers, and as an answer to the importance of the trading exchange between both

blocs and to the great amount of European investments in Mercosur. When the pact
becomes officially signed in 1999, it will establish joint cooperation mechanisms with
regards to customs for the inter-regional trade with the aim of completely freeing it by the
year 2008. (Hoke, 1997)
In this respect, it is important to point out that, in addition to any trade benefits which
may be derived from regional trade agreements, the latter imply (to a greater or lesser
degree) the partial or total elimination of tariff preferences received at a given time within
the Mercosur framework. This phenomenon would not be imaginable in the case of a
regional trade agreement which aimed at the discrimination of third parties or in which
the development of the regional market were "a purpose in itself' (Devlin, 1997)

The proliferation of preferential trade agreements clearly in evidence in the international
economy in recent years is putting the old ideal of multilateral liberalization in
international trade to the test. However, the idea that attempting to achieve an open
international economy does not necessarily exclude integration agreements which could
even facilitate its attainment has recently become accepted in both academic and
government circles. (Devlin, 1997)
It is important to understand that, although the interest of those American firms striving
to get into these new markets will be concentrated on the commercial possibilities of the
bloc or region, they, nevertheless, should specifically take into account the strategic
framework offered by the country that will constitute their basis. Special attention must
be paid to relevant factors such as economic deregulation, legal certainty, low tax cost
and the establishment of clear and simple non-economic governmental regulations that fit
in with international trade dynamics.
Mercosur has a vision of "open regionalism" meaning that it has no apparent walls
(except for CET) and the member nations do not want to be isolated from the rest of the
world. Despite the fact that a significant portion of Mercosur trade occurs within its
boundaries, the agreement was not conceived primarily as an intra-regional one, nor does
it aim to satisfy the needs of its own population. Rather, Mercosur is designed to serve
two main purposes: opening bigger markets for large companies operating within the
bloc, and creating increased competitiveness in order to reach markets outside the region.
(Ribeiro, 1997)
A clear example of this is that Mercosur, after one and a half years of the creation of the
customs union, concluded its first agreement of free trade with Chile, hoping to arrive at
a similar one with Bolivia and with the countries of the "Andean Pact". Mercosur also
actively participated in the initiative towards hemispheric integration (ALCA) and even
Mexico (that forms together with the US and Canada in NAFTA) expressed an interest in
being part of Mercosur. The formula to be applied would be that of "4+1", creating this
way a free trade area with a potential market that would cover almost the whole
American continent.

Likewise, Mercosur has begun dialogues with Japan, and India, and with other countries
of the world. Judging by the recent developments (i.e.: with Chile, Bolivia mentioned
previously), the integration process in Mercosur has made enormous strides and has
reached a level of interrelationship that provides a solid foundation for additional
progress in the years to come. (Omega, 1997).
One of the most interesting phenomena of the Mercosur process is the fact that from its
creation, as an area of preferential trade from 1991 and a customs union from 1995, the
volume of its commerce with the world has increased. That is for the partner countries,
Mercosur is not an "end in itself", but on the contrary it is a tool to be inserted in world
trade. (Hinkelman, 1996). This notion of Mercosur as a useful pathway for increased
international trade is a question I will address more specifically in my research.
Mercosur's regional trade with the rest of the world has increased by 74.3% (from 19901995) in comparison to the NAFTA's 21% and EU's 31.7% growth rate during that same
five year period.
Mercosur's ever growing role in global trade is evident by the recent October 1997
signing of the Mercosur-Chile Free Trade Zone Agreement between Mercosur and Chile
was created. This implies the institutionalization of an economic trade relation that was
naturally growing since the beginning of the decade at a rate of over 4.6% annually.
(Decker, 1997). Because the Chilean economy has an important international prestige, its
incorporation into Mercosur as an associate member can be considered as a "quality seal"
and a positive sign. Chile may indeed represent Mercosur's gateway into the Pacific
markets due to its geographic location (which makes it a natural bridge to the Pacific
Rim) and its close trade ties and past commitment in commerce with Southeast Asia.
The importance of Mercosur for the United States is reflected by the fact that more than
55 percent of its exports to South America are concentrated in the four Mercosur
countries. But without a doubt Mercosur's greatest impact has been the extraordinary
growth in trade and investment for its two biggest members, Argentina and Brazil.
Between 1986 and 1990 the region's share of Argentina's total trade remained around
14.3%. Regional trade began to grow rapidly in 1991 with an increase of its share in total
Argentine trade from 18.7% in 1991 to 26.5% in 1994 and to 28% during the first six
months of 1995. (Hoopes, 1996).

5. ARGENTINA WITHIN MERCOSUR
Argentina not only has reversed the poor economic performance evidenced during the
past decade, but during the 90's its economic improvement (through membership in
Mercosur) has been one of the most successful of Western nations. (Campbell, 1997).
Considering variables such as the increasing GDP, the investment rate and specially
foreign trade, the current results indicate a prosperous period of growth for this country.
(Decker, 1996) But before embarking on a more in depth analysis of the nation's present

economic conditions, it is necessary to understand its overall role it has within Mercosur
in terms of regional trade with the member nations.
Between 1986 and 1990, the region's share of Argentina's total trade remained around
14,3%. However, as Mercosur evolved in both strength and stability, regional trade began
to grow rapidly in 1991 with an increase of its share in total Argentine trade from 18,7%
in 1991 to 26,5% in 1994 and to 28% during the first six months of 1995. During 1996,
this figure jumped to 31% and has remained here through most of 1997.

Figure 4
ARGENTINA'S TRADE WITH MERCOSUR
Mercosur's % of Total Argentine Trade

Source: Madigan, 1998
Presently, Argentina's trade with Mercosur nations represents approximately 31% of
Argentina's trade with the world. The structure of imports to its neighbors is
representative to that of the rest of the world's. Intermediate goods (33%) constitute the
greater volume in imports, followed by consumption goods (21%), then capital goods
(20%), parts and accessories for capital goods (18%), passenger vehicles (5%), and fuel
(3%).
Figure 4(a)

STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS
(1996)

Source: Ministry of Economy Report, 1997
Argentine exports to the Mercosur nations is comprised of primary products: 28%
(including cereals, unprocessed vegetables, legumes, fresh fruits, livestock, etc),
manufactures of farming origin or MFO: 37% (leather and furs, edible oils and fat, dairy
products, processed fish and seafood), manufactures of industrial origin or MIO: 30%
(transport material, machinery an electric equipment, related chemical products, textiles
and clothing, artificial plastic material), fuel and energy: 5%.

Figure 4(b)
STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS

Source: Ministry of Economy report, 1997
Within the framework of Mercosur, Argentina is consolidating two main principles to
guarantee the sustained development and the welfare of its citizens: the politics
rationality and the economic rationality. These principles (which will be discussed in
greater detail later on in the paper) have led to overall stability evident in

1. Convertibility Law: Argentina's 1991 law fixed the exchange rate parity against the US
dollar and provided that it could not be changed with the approval of the Congress. As
under a monetary system called a "currency board", the Law also provided that the
monetary base had to be backed by foreign reserves. This prevents the central bank from
discretionary issuance of money, such as for financing a budget deficit, and ensures a
firm limit to the growth of the money supply.
2. Price Stability: achieved through drastic reduction in inflation figures.
3. Argentina's growing importance and key role within Mercosur: the emerging role of
Argentina at the head front of the Mercosur union is becoming more clear through current
economic indicators and socio-political stability in the region.
4. Privatization of Public Enterprises
5. Fiscal Balance through reduction of trade deficit
6. Environmental Protection
7. New Investment Legislation and Tax Reforms
8. Nuclear Non Proliferation agreements
Argentina's exports have increased between 1989 and 1995 at annual accumulative rate
average of almost 14% (placing it among the highest, as far as growth is concerned, in the
world).
The success of the convertibility plan with regard to anti-inflationary incentives (thus
resulting in a dramatic decrease of inflation rate in past years), allows Argentina to be
among the nations with the lowest inflation rates in the world. Two of the main
achievements Argentina has obtained in the last few years are credibility and certain
economic recovery, especially in the exchange market and in commercial issues. In this
sense, the notable decline in country risk since 1991 enabled the state and private sector
to finance themselves better in the international capital markets (Hoopes, 1996)

Table 5
EXPORTS
GROWTH RATE
COUNTRIES

CHINA
OTHER ASIAN NICs

(Annual Average Cumulative Rate:
1989-1995)

19%
16%

TRADE
GROWTH RATE
(Annual Average
Cumulative
Rate: 1989-1995)

20%
16.70%

ARGENTINA
MEXICO
CHILE
EUROPEAN UNION
UNITED STATES
BRAZIL
REST OF WORLD

13.90%
13.20%
12.10%
9.10%
8.20%
6.10%
9.20%

16.40%
13.60%
13.20%
10.10%
8.30%
6.90%
9.10%

Source: UN Statistical Yearbook (40th Edition)
All these factors have generated an environment of wider credibility and farsightedness.
This greater confidence makes possible the performance of a major number of productive
projects that were not possible before for the high risk rates. With democracy and
economic stability the possibilities to obtain a positive and convenient interaction with
the rest of the world is decisively increased.

6. ARGENTINE FOREIGN TRADE
The Origin of Argentine Foreign Trade
During much of its modern history, Argentina has focused on the export of primary
commodity agricultural products and the import of manufactured, high-value-added
goods. This pattern was altered during the 1940's and 1950's with the advent of protective
tariff and non-tariff barriers, imposed to allow the development of domestic import
substitution industries. For most of the 1960's through the 1980's, Argentina's national
policy shifted back and forth between an open and a closed regime, to the detriment of
both foreign and domestic interests. (Hinkelman, 1996)
After amassing large trade surpluses for most of the 1980's, during which time the
government discouraged imports in an attempt to stabilize Argentina's finances, policy
makers shifted again. In 1989 they adopted an open-market approach, allowing the
economy to run up substantial trade deficits while encouraging the import of capital
goods and other inputs to strengthen domestic production. While this deregulation
enabled Argentine industries more access to the equipment needed to upgrade production,
it also unfortunately hurt many local industries that were unable to compete with foreign
goods that flooded the domestic market. This was particularly true for manufacturers of
consumer goods. Although roughly 20% (US$4.41bn) of total imports (US$21.544bn)
still consist of consumer goods (Hinkelman, 1996)--despite high import duties designed
to restrict such trade in nonessentials-- the vast bulk of imports are now made up of
capital goods, parts for such goods, and intermediate inputs.
The Argentines in general remain somewhat distressed that the payoff in terms of highervalue-added exports has yet to be realized from allowing this import-driven trade deficit

to swell. Nevertheless, the trend is positive, especially in comparison with the past, when
imports were predominantly for industrial inputs and domestic consumption. The current
surge in investment in Argentina's industry should begin to show greater long term results
by the year 2000.
In line with its open market policy, the Argentine government reduced and eliminated
many previous existing barriers to international trade, resulting in the doubling of foreign
trade between 1980 and 1996. The maximum import tariff was cut by more than half,
from 50 to 20 percent, and the 15 percent surcharge (which constituted a minimum
charge) was fully eliminated, allowing some goods to enter duty free. In 1989 the average
tariff was 39 percent; just five years later in January 1994 the average tariff had fallen to
9.1 percent (Hoopes, 1996).
Today the tariffs on almost all imports have fallen even further, and as a signatory to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Argentina has pledged to reduce them
even more. Discretionary import licensing, which had served to strictly limit imports in
the past, was also dropped. At the same time, the administration also eliminated most
export tariffs and implemented a drawback system to rebate tariffs on inputs for products
destined for export. Between 1980 and 1995, foreign trade grew at a compound annual
growth rate (CAGR) of nearly 5 percent (Hoopes 1996).

The 1995 inauguration of Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur) --a customs union
consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay that allows preferential trade to
occur among these partners-- has dramatically altered the trade situation for Argentina.
Preferential trade among Mercosur began in 1991, and free trade went into effect in 1995.
Argentina's 1993 trade with its Mercosur partners rose by nearly 30 percent (from the
previous two years), and has steadily grown. Although Argentina currently maintains a
trade deficit with these nations, its exports to them are also rising sharply. As the full
provisions of the agreement take effect, the mutual benefits among all the trading partners
are expected to continue to multiply.

Size of Argentina's Foreign Trade
After taking a large downfall in the 1980's, Argentina's total foreign trade has more than
tripled in the past ten years, rising roughly from US$11.6 billion in 1986 to
approximately US$40 billion in 1996. During these same years, the share of Argentina's
gross domestic product (GDP) representing foreign trade has remained nearly level at an
average of 12.5 percent. (De la Balze, 1996)
This indicates that domestic production and foreign trade have been expanding at close to
the same pace. The relative proportion of foreign trade to the total economy also
graphically points up that the Argentine economy continues to be largely oriented toward
the domestic sphere: more than 85 percent of the economy is focused on domestic
markets. While the share of foreign trade relative to the economy appears to be growing,

the overall proportional increase has been slight. Nevertheless, the focus is currently
export production.
In relation to other countries trading in world markets, the percentage of Argentina's GDP
represented by foreign trade is fairly low. For example, in 1992 the following countries
registered levels of foreign trade relative to their GDP's higher than the 11.8 percent
registered by Argentina.

Table 6
FOREIGN TRADE RELATIVE TO GDP
COUNTRY
Brazil

% GDP REPRESENTED BY
FOREIGN TRADE
15%

Mexico

23.4% (37.3% with maquila trade)

Japan

15.20%

China

40.20%

Taiwan

76.90%

United States

17.50%

Great Britain

43.80%

France

46. 20%

Germany

60%

Argentina

11.84%

Source: de la Baize (1996)
All these numbers point to the fact that Argentina continues to concentrate on its
domestic markets to a greater extent than many other countries with more developed or
rapidly expanding economies.
The emphasis on domestic markets in Argentina is a function of two factors or variables:
• Argentina's economy is still relatively undeveloped when compared with the more
developed economies of such nations as European Union (EU) members like the UK,
France and Germany, which depend on foreign trade for a much greater proportion of
their overall economic activity.
• Argentina's proportionally large and important domestic markets constitute the core of
its economy, as is also the situation in Brazil, the US, and Japan. Many domestic

producers are just starting to enter the international trade sector, and it is a slow process
because many of these producers need to invest heavily in imported capital goods and
intermediate inputs to upgrade their production capabilities. The process is made even
more difficult because the opening of Argentina's markets to increase the availability of
those imports has also intensified the competition at home. Thus, domestic producers are
having to become more competitive not only in international markets, but simultaneously
in Argentine markets. (Carlsson, 1997)

Prior to 1989 Argentina's markets were for the most part closed to imports, while exports
were highly concentrated in a few sectors. When open markets were implemented,
foreign trade performed as might be expected --that is, it surged rapidly. The overall
numbers also camouflage a significant differential in the rate of growth of the various
trade components. Imports have more than quadrupled (from US$4.7 billion in 1986 to
over US$22 billion in 1996, while exports have more than doubled (from US$6.8 billion
in 1986 to US$16 billion in 1996). This differential between growth patterns between
imports and exports has arisen largely because of the need to import modern technology
before domestic industries can supply exports in such quantity, quality, and diversity as
to become competitive in global markets. This gap --between imports and exports-- is
likely to continue for some time, and narrowing it will require:
1. Intensive capital investment
2. Modification of the management structure
3. Training of the workforce
Many Argentine businesses -and whole industries- are now engaged in this challenge.
Those that find a way to persevere will start to transform the current trade deficit into a
more balanced level of foreign trade.

Exports
Until the 1990's exports from Argentina remained at approximately the same level for
decades, although tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports permitted the country to post
trade surpluses until 1981. The products exported were highly concentrated in three
sectors: agriculture, industrial manufactures, and fuels. From 1980 through 1989 roughly
2/3 of Argentina's exports continued to be associated with agriculture (primary products
averaged 30 percent; agricultural manufactures --processed and semi processed-averaged 37 percent). About 1/5 of exports (21 percent) during the 1980's were industrial
manufactures, consisting mainly of base metals (iron, steel, aluminum, some machinery,
and chemicals). Only about 4 percent of the exports were fuels and fuel derivatives,
production by the state-run monopoly was designed primarily to fill domestic need rather
than to contribute to export revenues.

The country is still known primarily for its agricultural exports (grain, oilseeds, and meat
products). According to statistics compiled by Argentina's National Institute of Census
Statistics (INDEC) for 1996, exports of agricultural manufactures fell to a 29 percent
share from a 37 percent share of total exports, while primary (agricultural) products
dropped to a 24 percent share from a 38 percent share --or combined, from nearly 3/4 to
about 112. Meanwhile, industrial manufactures rose to a 37 percent share from a 21
percent in 1996. Fuel exports rose as well, to a 10 percent share from a 4 percent share,
but the real story was the surge in higher-value-added manufactured industrial products.
In 1996 exports were still heavily concentrated in a few sectors, but diversification was
beginning to be visible. In that year INDEC reported that the top four exports (fuels, fats
and oils, food byproducts, and cereals) together made up 37 percent of total merchandise
exports. The top ten exports represented roughly 70 percent of all exports. Some of the
highest growth in exports in 1996 came from higher-value-added goods, including
transportation equipment (up 25.6%), chemical products (up 29.5%), and machinery and
electrical products (up 13.2%)
For some, the shift in Argentine exports is occurring too slowly. Some analysts have
voiced concern that the growth of non-traditional, higher-value-added exports needs to be
further encouraged if they are going to supply the foreign exchange that is currently being
supplied through foreign investment. Nevertheless, export rates have been growing
steadily since 1992. In dollar terms, exports took a 3 percent dip in 1991, but then
recovered, growing by 2.1 percent in 1992, by an even stronger 7 percent in 1993, by 14
percent in 1994, and by 20 percent in 1996. (Hoopes, 1996)

Table 7
ARGENTINE EXPORTS BY CATEGORY 1996
PRODUCT CATEGORY

US$BILLION PERCENT

FUELS
FATS AND OILS
FOOD BY PRODUCTS
CEREALS
OILSEEDS
MEAT
TRANSPORTATION
MACHINERY AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
BASE METALS
HIDES AND LEATHER
CHEMICALS

1.619
1.533
1.341
1.323
0.953
0.912
0.903
0.855
0.786
0.762
0.724

10.3
9.7
8.5
8.4
6.1
5.8
5.7
5.4
5.1
4.8
4.6

SEAFOOD (FRESH)
SEAFOOD (PROCESSED)
VEGETABLES (FRESH)
MINERAL PRODUCTS
OTHER MISCELLANEOUS
TOTAL

0.441
0.278
0.254
0.25
2.805
15.739

2.8
1.8
1.6
1.6
17.8
100

Source: INDEC, 1996

Imports
Argentina has become a hot market for imports. Imports grew by 20-fold between 1965
and 1996, but the major growth has only been since 1991 when the more open policies of
the Menem government began to go into effect. During much of the 1980's, the nation
discouraged products from abroad, but Argentina is continuing to open its markets,
reduce tariffs, deregulate government monopolies, and stabilize its exchange rate
(currently pegged to the US Dollar). End user demand is high for both consumer and
industrial goods.
As mentioned before, imports of capital goods, intermediate products, and parts and
accessories represented 72.5 percent of imports by economic utilization category in 1996.
In another listing by more specific categories, it was shown that machinery and electronic
equipment represented the largest category of imports in 1996, accounting for 34 percent
of all imports (up 27 percent from the previous year). Imports of transportation
equipment ranked second at 18 percent (up 43 percent), indicating the strength of the
Argentine automotive industry, because much of this tariff represents trade in
components with Brazil. Chemicals represented the third largest category with a 12
percent share of total merchandise imports (up 28 percent). Together these three
categories accounted for nearly 2/3 of Argentina's 1996 imports, as well as for all imports
categories representing more than US$ 2 billion and 14 percent of the total. The top ten
import categories account for 92 percent of all imports.

Table 8
ARGENTINE IMPORTS BY CATEGORY
1996
PRODUCT CATEGORY

US$BILLION PERCENTAGE

MACHINERY AND ELECTRONIC
EQUIPMENT

7.415

34.4

TRANSPORTATION

3.834

17. 8

CHEMICALS

2.577

12

BASE METALS

1.272

5.9

PLASTICS

1.113

5.2

TEXTILE PRODUCTS

0.828

3.8

MINERAL PRODUCTS

0.801

3.7

PRECISION INSTRUMENTS

0.708

3.3

PAPER PRODUCTS

0.694

3.2

FOOD PRODUCTS

0.593

2.8

PLANT PRODUCTS

0.343

1.6

LIVE ANIMALS

0.251

1.2

CEMENT AND GLASS

0.226

1

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS

0.889

4.1

TOTAL

21.544

100

Source: INDEC, 1996

Trade Partners
Argentina's dominant trade partner is its largest neighbor, Brazil. Brazil achieved this
standing in 1992 and has retained it every year since then. In 1996 Brazil accounted for
US$ 7.875 billion (21.1 percent) of Argentina's total trade. The nation's second largest
partner is the United States, with US$ 6.645 billion (17.8 percent) of total trade.
Argentina conducts almost 39 percent of its trade with these two countries alone.
Aside from the two largest trading partners, eight other nations had trade with Argentina
greater than US$ 1 billion in value in 1996. Individually their share of total foreign trade
ranged from 5.5 percent to 2.9 percent, falling substantially below those of the top two
partners. In order of their ranking these are:

Table 9
ARGENTINA'S TOP TRADING PARTNERS
1996
COUNTRY

TOTAL [US$ BILLION]

BRAZIL

7.875

UNITED STATES

6.645

ITALY

2.069

GERMANY

1.988

CHILE

1.812

THE NETHERLANDS

1.528

SPAIN

1.442

URUGUAY

1.43

FRANCE

1.286

JAPAN

1.071

Source: Cooper, 1998
When foreign trade with these eight traders is combined with the two top partners, the top
ten trade partners account for almost 73 percent of Argentina's trade. Argentina's trade
relationships with its neighboring countries have been significantly affected by Mercosur.
From 1975 to 1989, an average of only about 11 percent of Argentina's total foreign trade
was conducted with Brazil. When the first step of preferential trade began at the start of
the present decade, that figure jumped to 17 percent in 1990, and it has been rising
steadily ever since. By 1992 Brazil had become Argentina's number one trading partner,
and the amount and proportion of trade between the two countries continues to grow. To
date Brazil has been the major purchaser of Argentina's new, non traditional, highervalue-added exports.

Balance of Trade
During the past 30 years, Argentina has maintained a balance of merchandise trade
surplus in all but four years: 1981 and 1992 through 1994. During many of these years,
Argentina actively managed its trade by using tariff and other barriers to artificially
exclude imports. When open-market policies were introduced, imports began to outpace
exports, causing deficits in the early 1990's. Based on improved export performance in
early 1995 and 1996, officials have projected break-even performance, or perhaps even a
slight surplus by the end of the decade. (Fidler, 1997). To regain its trade surplus, the
country is focusing on diversifying its exports, stepping up production of high-valued
added goods, and trading with its Mercosur partners.
Argentina's current accounts have been in deficit in 20 of the past 30 years, most recently
showing a surplus only in 1990. In addition to merchandise trade, the current account
deficit includes trade in invisibles (services), investment payments, and transfers.
Argentina has generally maintained a deficit position in trade in services, and has
historically paid out more investment income than it has received, keeping its finances on
edge. Countries that generate substantial amounts of inbound investment and a high rate
of growth in the domestic economy can sustain such disparities, but imbalances in current
accounts pose more than the usual danger for Argentina, because its domestic economy
could still be hurt by the loss of the outside funds.
Thus the development of exports, especially non traditional ones, is taking on greater
urgency. In 1996 non traditional industrial products accounted for 40% of the growth in
exports. In comparison, 40% of the increase in imports consisted of capital goods, which

in turn are being used to increase productivity. Argentines point out that their current
account deficit in 1996 was only 4% of its GDP, barely half the level of Mexico's deficit
when it got into trouble at the end of that year. (Carlsson, 1997).
As Argentines focus more and more on opportunities within Mercosur, the balance of
trade situation is indicative of trends. Trade with Mercosur members posted a deficit of
US$ 1.428 billion in 1995; however, this was reduced to US$ 530 million in 1996, and
US$ 389 million in 1997. (Warn, 1998).

Argentine Trade Policy
The wide ranging reform programs introduced back in 1989 have effected drastic changes
in an economy that had reached an acute crisis stage in the late 1980's. Most of the statist
controls imposed during prior decades have been fully removed, deregulation and
restructuring of public and private sectors is well underway, and industries are being
privatized. Argentina has adopted outward -looking trade policies in this early phase of
economic recovery.
Even with the government's adoption of open market trade policies, the process of
becoming internationally competitive is proving to be somewhat slow, yet certain. There
is a great need to reform industry, management, and labor structures. Open market
policies have not eliminated the issues that Argentine businesses face in producing goods
that can compete in both domestic and international markets. As a result, imports are
likely to remain high for some time in order to meet domestic consumer demand,
industrial investment in capital goods, and consumption of intermediate inputs for reexport production. However, it is in this situation that US businesses can seek to
maximize their opportunities. The rising consumer demand in these areas, represents
unchartered waters for potential growth in which American companies can derive the
most benefit. (Decker, 1997)
The government has committed itself with its open trade policies for he most part,
allowing for a transitional period only when protection of an important industry becomes
necessary for its survival. Nearly barriers to exports have been eliminated, and exports
have been showing an increased growth rate --growth was particularly strong during the
first six months of 1996-- although growth has nevertheless been comparatively gradual
and occurs from a relatively low base level. (Carlsson, 1997).
Observers argue that 1996 has been the turning point for Argentina's exports. First, some
see the domestic market as nearly saturated for a wide range of goods, even without the
negative effects of the emerging markets downturn in early 1996 which have served to
depress imports. Second, and more positively, the effects of investment appear to be
greatly more noticeable: Argentine manufacturing activity --up by 15% in 1996 from
1995-- increased for the 21 st consecutive quarter in the first quarter of 1996. (Fidler,
1997). Also, the fixture years promise to be a record period for harvests of agricultural

products, while international demand seems to be either growing or at least stable for the
intermediate products that form the bulk of Argentina's exports.
The Argentine government is seeking to improve trading relationships and increase
export access regionally -culminating in bilateral trade agreements and in the Mercosur
pact -and on a global scale through GATT, potential ties with EU, and the future
hemispheric free trade area of the Americas (FTAA).

7. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN ARGENTINA
Origin of Foreign Investment
Leading Foreign Investors: The main sources of foreign investment in Argentina are the
US, Europe, and its closest Latin American neighbors, Chile and Brazil. The US has been
the leading foreign investor in Argentina, topping the list in 1991 through 1994; US
investors' share of the country's total foreign investment over the past four years was
more than 40 percent. Much of that participation has been in the form of the purchase of
privatized assets (primarily infrastructure assets), with the next most prevalent form
representing capital investments in the consumer products, and automotive industries.

Table 10
U.S FINANCIAL INVESTMENT POSITION IN ARGENTINA
(US$ millions)
YEAR

PUBLIC SECTOR BONDS

SHARES AND CB

TOTAL INVESTMENTS

1992

853

1.148

2.001

1993

7512

10470

17982

1994

10127

13963

24090

1995

5574

9207

14881

1996

7648

12730

20378

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce, 1997.

Table 11
US DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION IN ARGENTINA
(US$ millions)
PERIOD

POSITION

(US$ MILLIONS)
1974 - 1978

6818

1979 - 1983

12930

1984 - 1988

13338

1989 - 1993

15331

1994 - 1996

22426

TOTAL

70,843

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. US Department of Commerce, 1997.
Other principal foreign investors include those from Italy, Spain, France, Brazil, Chile,
Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Canada. As noted, backing the overall
foreign investment trend are bilateral agreements between Argentina and various
countries, primarily those from Europe and the Americas. Typically, these bilateral trade
agreements establish a government-to-government framework for channeling private
investment and official financing and guarantees between firms from the participating
nations. They also usually provide for international arbitration of investment disputes and
grant foreign investors protection from uncompensated expropriation and full capita)
repatriation rights (even in the event of a currency crisis). The agreements and new
reforms have gone a long way toward reducing Argentine sovereign risk for all investors,
not just those covered under bilateral national agreements.
Sources of foreign capital are expected to diversify in the wake of the continued
expansion of free market reforms around the world. Argentina's rich natural resource
wealth, relatively high national income, open market economic policy, and historical
international bent should continue to make it attractive to foreign capital in the years to
come.
Based on announced projects scheduled for completion between 1994 and 2000, the US
should remain the major investor in Argentina, being involved in 35 projects and 5
additional joint ventures with Argentine or third country firms. French firms are
participating in 7 projects plus 4 multinational joint ventures; UK firms in 7, plus 3 joint
ventures; and German firms in 7, plus 1 joint venture. Other investors include Chileans (6
projects and 3 joint ventures); Canadians (4 and 2); Italians (4 and 2); Japanese (2 and 1);
Mexican (2 and 1); Dutch (2 and 1); Brazilian (2 and 1); Swiss (2 projects); Australian (1
project and 1 joint venture); and the Irish and Venezuelans with 1 project each.

Investment Climate and Trends
Historical Perspective At the beginning of the 20th century, Argentina was a liberal
democracy with the tenth largest economy and the sixth highest per capita income in the
world. Its abundant natural resources, coupled with some of the best agricultural land in
the world, attracted immigrants and development capital from around the globe. Indeed,

these factors --together with a largely middle class population of European ancestry -made for a welcome and attractive environment for direct foreign investment. In the late
19th and early 20th centuries foreign investors, primarily from the US and the UK,
rushed in to develop first infrastructure --ports, railways, and electric power and natural
gas production and distribution facilities-- and later manufacturing operations.
For 1880 to 1930 the nation flourished with a stable currency tied to a gold standard and
an annual average inflation rate of only 1.5 percent; between 1900 and 1920 gross
domestic product (GDP) doubled. Moderate protectionism began to develop during the
period of World War I; however, this focus on import substitution actually opened
additional opportunities to establish manufacturing plants in Argentina. During these
years, major foreign corporations from the US, the UK, and Germany opened plants to
manufacture electrical products, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals and cosmetics.
Unfortunately, the prosperous times wound down, and the Argentine economy was
seriously damaged by the economic dislocations of the Great Depression.
Both demand and prices for Argentine exports fell dramatically, and the international
climate of protectionism led to a domestically oriented economy and-during the 1940s-to
the nationalization of some public services, such as railroads and power generation and
distribution. Nevertheless, even during this period, foreign firms continued to establish
Argentine plants to manufacture consumer durables for the domestic market, although
they were hampered by a lack of locally available subcontractors, materials, and
components. This situation led many operations to integrate vertically to produce the
needed inputs. This expensive strategy was sustained by the monopoly and nearmonopoly status the producers enjoyed in serving the isolated Argentine domestic
market, but led to industries with a cost structure that was largely non-competitive in
international markets.
Economic recovery and pent-up demand allowed markets to develop, and --in the late
1950s-- led to the enactment of a pro-foreign investment regime. This policy shift
attracted investment, primarily in the automotive, petroleum refining, chemical and
petrochemical, and machinery and equipment industries. The resulting surge in foreign
investment led in turn to over expansion in some areas and a subsequent halt in new
investment. Until the turnaround in policy that decreed an open economic system under
the Menem administration in the late 1980s that made Argentina far more attractive to
international investment, most foreign investment consisted of the incremental expansion
and upgrading of existing operations.
Fortunately, the reforms of the Menem administration seem to be working in many
critical policy areas. Argentina's economic problems are now little worse than those of
many European countries. The days of high volatility in macro-economics variables and
in government policy-making seem to have come to an end. The growing maturity of the
system has begun to promise the stability that enables the longer range business planning
critical to attracting foreign capital, and --perhaps even more important-- has begun to
restore the public's confidence in the political and financial system.

Development of Liberal Investment Policies The unprecedented economic boom led by
free-market reform has likely changed forever the pace of and attitude toward direct
foreign investment in Argentina. Out of the depths of decades of managed economics and
economic nationalism has emerged a more democratic, global market-oriented economy
that is virtually wide open to foreign investors. Since 1989 Argentina has largely
welcomed --and even actively encouraged-- foreign investment, facilitating it to a greater
extent than ever before. Argentina has, in a few short years, developed what is arguably
the most liberal foreign investment regime in Latin America.
The Menem administration's free market policies have swept away a great deal of
excessive regulation, reduced tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, abolished the foreign
exchange controls that had hamstrung its international economic posture, placed foreign
and local investors on equal footing, and greatly reduced currency risk. In sum, the
regime has created an entirely new playing field for foreign investors. Not surprisingly,
some of the same investors who drained an estimated US$50 billion in capital out of the
country during the 1980s are now leading the charge to put their funds back into the
economy under more favorable terms. Since the reforms of 1989-1991, more than US$30
billion in portfolio and direct foreign investment has made its way to Argentina.
The privatization of state-owned businesses --such as oil giant Yacimientos Petroliferos
Fiscales (YPF) and the national telephone company-- was a leading element in attracting
foreign investment. The stabilization of the Argentine peso under the Convertibility Law
(which pegged the peso to the US dollar on a one-to-one exchange rate), the opening of
local financial and capital markets to restriction-free foreign participation, and the
reemergence of local credit have provided the market liquidity critical to direct
investment.
Elimination of Investment Barriers Crippling barriers to foreign investment --such as
outright bans on participation in some sectors and discriminatory operating approval
procedures-- have been removed. A 1989 amendment to the 1976 Foreign Investment
Law provided for "national treatment," giving foreign investors the same rights and
obligations as local investors. In 1993 measures contained in the 1989 Economic
Emergency Law, the 1989 State Reform Law, and the 1993 Foreign Investment Law
were combined in a single act known as Decree 1853, which has removed nearly all
restraints on foreign investment. Now, with certain government-mandated exceptions,
foreign entities may own 100 percent of Argentine companies and may repatriate capital
and remit profits back to the home country without limit. In general --in contrast to recent
years-- Argentine laws, regulations, and policies do not interfere with foreign investment.
In addition, the 1992 Bilateral Investment Treaty with the US, Argentina's largest foreign
investor, guarantees US companies the right to invest in the private sector on a most
favored nation basis, that is, at terms that are at least as favorable as those accorded to
domestic or third-party investors. Other bilateral investment agreements are in force with
Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. In addition, treaties with Chile and
Turkey had received congressional approval and awaited final ratification, while treaties

awaiting congressional approval were signed with Armenia, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Denmark,
Ecuador, Finland, Jamaica, the Netherlands, Rumania, Senegal, Tunisia, and Venezuela.
Further treaties or additional treaty provisions were under negotiation with Ecuador,
Finland, Iceland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Norway, Russia, South Korea, and the
United Arab Emirates.
Favorable results of this long-standing international interaction between Argentina and
other nations include standards of business that are more or less in line with practices in
industrialized countries and a net positive relationship between Argentines and foreign
business interests, making Argentina an attractive place for foreign entities seeking
business relationships. And Argentina is perhaps the Latin American nation that is best
disposed toward European and US business culture. Argentines are familiar with and
continue to demand foreign products and services, which have long set the standard in the
country. At present, this is particularly true for US goods such as consumer products and
entertainment items. With local firms actively seeking foreign participation to raise
capital and benefit from managerial and technological transfers, and the removal of all
restrictions on capital movements, there seems to be few --if any-- better locations in
Latin America for growth-oriented direct foreign investment.
Argentina's cumulative growth rate in its GDP of approximately 30 percent between 1991
and 1994 places it among the fastest growing in the world. However, growth has been
largely concentrated in certain manufacturing industries and not all sectors have
benefited. In fact, some provincial economies have actually contracted during this period.
Industrial production has risen almost 60 percent since the implementation of the
Convertibility Law.

Size of Foreign Investment
Cumulative, recorded, direct, non-financial foreign investment (investment other than
portfolio investment placed in securities that can be liquidated rapidly --the so-called "hot
money") in Argentina as of year end 1993 amounted to approximately US$28 billion for
the period 1990-1993, the third largest inflow among emerging markets worldwide (only
Mexico and China received more foreign investment during the period). Significantly,
nearly one-third of that total was in the form of investment in assets privatized by the
Argentine government. Estimates for private capital inflow in 1994 vary, but should
result in the addition of another US$3 to US$5 billion to the cumulative total. This is a
dramatic turnaround for an economy that saw net private capital outflows of an estimated
US$50 billion during the 1980s; more than US$5 billion fled abroad during Argentina's
economic and financial turmoil in 1989-1990 alone.
In 1990 and 1991, more than US$15 billion in net private capital made its way back into
Argentina. Foreign investment reform, currency stabilization, the beginning of effective
privatization efforts, and a drastic reduction in perceived country risk-which fell to less
than 3 percent from almost 32 percent by one measure between early 1990 and year end

1993 were major contributors to this reversal. In addition, macro-economics and global
financial market trends during this time, such as the beginning of a recovery from
recession among the DECD nations, and a low interest rate environment that pushed
global investors towards opportunities in higher-yielding emerging economies, added to
favorable domestic conditions.
Foreign investment continued its heated pace during 1992, remaining strong in 1993 and
1994. The Deregulation Decree and the Bilateral Investment Treaty with the US,
eliminating most restrictions on internal commerce and foreign trade, set the tone for
investor optimism in 1992. Mass privatization continued unabated with foreign investors
eventually becoming the beneficiary owners of more than one-third of all privatized
assets. By the end of 1993, foreign companies had purchased nearly US$9.6 billion in
asset value of privatized entities. Private capital inflow in 1992 almost reached US$8
billion and was slightly more than US$5 billion for 1993. With privatization largely
completed, the massive capital inflows of the early 1990s are expected to subside.
However, assuming continued growth and stability, foreign investment should remain in
a surplus position for the remainder of the decade, although observers expect annual
flows to level off at a figure around US$2 billion. Projects valued at more than US$16.5
billion have been announced or contracted for between 1994 and 2000.

Sectors of Foreign Investment
As noted, the largest share of recent foreign capital has gone towards the purchase of
privatized state firms and their assets. The second largest share of foreign capital inflows
has gone to the private sector through equity investments and credit. Foreign direct
investment is occurring through direct purchase of assets, mergers and acquisitions, and
new business formations, primarily from major multinational industrial corporations.
Infrastructure sectors such as telecommunications, sewer and water, oil and gas,
transportation, ports and port services, and mining have received the greatest portion of
the capital inflows. Other sectors that have participated to a significant degree include
manufacturing, especially of automobiles and household durable and non-durable goods,
and the construction and housing industries. Government policy is currently encouraging
investment in a variety of sectors, including mining, construction, the auto industry,
energy, forestry, fishing, processed agricultural products, and tourism.
For projects scheduled between 1994 and 2000, the greatest number are in food,
beverage, and tobacco processing, while the next highest number --and highest dollar
value-- are found in the automotive sector, with 12 scheduled projects, mostly
representing the expansion of existing operations. Some 12 projects represent various
industrial and consumer manufacturing operations, while oil and gas production and
distribution account for 8 projects; electric power generation and distribution for 5
projects; and mining operations for 3 projects. Other areas include various
telecommunications and broadcasting projects; wood and paper products; and
pharmaceuticals projects. Investment in services is also growing, with several

investments in large-scale retail and wholesale ventures being particularly noteworthy, as
are investments in financial and business services, and hotels.

Table 12
US DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION BY INDUSTRY (US $
millions)
INDUSTRY
Petroleum
Manufacturing

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
470

409

499

566

815

903

930

1293 1461 1633 1993 2571 3576 3760

Banking

149

148

159

135

626

839

950

Wholesale Trade

337

361

430

552

603 1057 1250

Finance

168

302

538

578

801

801

860

Services

41

49

60

77

83

107

150

Other

21

362

35

455

445

699

850

Source: Argentina's National Security Commission, 1997. (Table 12 and Figure 7)

Figure 7
US DIRECT INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY

Investment Policy and Changes

Foreign investment is legally defined as any contribution of capital belonging to foreign
investors and/or the acquisition of shares of existing domestic enterprise using foreign
capital. In general, any investment made by foreign individuals, companies, or
unincorporated entities, as well as by Argentine companies with more than 49 percent
foreign ownership control --or in which foreigners have the right to appoint and control
the management of the entity-- is deemed foreign investment. However, investments
made by foreigners resident full time in Argentina are generally classified as domestic
investment, while those made by Argentine nationals residing abroad are considered
foreign investment.

Investment Authorization and Procedures--National Registry of Foreign Investment
Foreign investors have the same rights and obligations that the Argentine Constitution
and laws give to national investors involved in economic or productive activities within
the country. At this time, foreign investment does not require formal approval and the
registration on the Registro de Inversiones de Capital Extranjero (the Registry of
Investment for Foreign Capital, or RICE) is optional, other than that decreed by specific
legislation such as in the case of financial institutions and mass media. This does make
for trouble in assembling accurate national investment statistics but does remove much of
the red tape from the formerly cumbersome investment registration process.
The Secretaria de Comercio a Inversiones (the Secretariat of Trade and Investments) of
the Ministry of Economy constitutes the nation's foreign investment authority. Foreign
entities wishing to invest in Argentina for the first time are encouraged to contact this
agency for specific information on the rules and regulations regarding the type of
investment contemplated.
Foreign investors may make investments using any foreign currency, capital goods,
capital or profits from existing operations denominated in local currency, or intangible
assets under certain conditions. They may also invest by means of capitalization of
accounts payable to foreign creditors. In short, just about any assets can be used for
investing in Argentina. Investment can also be made by the conversion of foreign debt
into equity. This is usually accomplished when foreigners who desire to invest buy
sovereign Argentine foreign debt at a discount on international markets, submitting this
debt to the Argentine government for cancellation, and receiving official assets valued at
a peso equivalent in return. The investor receives assets rather than cash, and usually
must plan on making additional cash investments for upgrades and working capital. This
option is generally available only for public assets, although it may be possible to invest
in private operations through debt-equity conversion by negotiating with the authorities
on a case-by-case basis.
An investor may voluntarily register with the RICE. No benefits accrue to firms choosing
to register, although at times in the past registration was required in order to obtain
foreign exchange to repatriate capital and earnings. Registration consists of a formal
notification including the following:

• Name and address of the foreign investor.
• Name and location of the target firm.
• Description and purpose of investment activity.
• Currency used and the amount of the investment.
For transactions between a foreign-owned local company and its parent that involve a
technology or trademark transfer, assignment, or license by foreign nationals in favor of
Argentine residents or entities, the parties must submit a registration request to the
Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia Industrial (the National Institute of Industrial
Technology, or INTI). Terms and conditions of the transaction and the consideration
given should conform to standard market practices and have a reasonable relationship to
the technology transferred. Such contracts between unrelated parties may be registered
for informational and tax purposes. Patents, trademarks, and copyrights are protected in
Argentina but, as is true worldwide, infringements can and do occur because effective
enforcement is difficult. Investors are urged to familiarize themselves with local rules,
customs, and practices in an effort to avoid infringement problems.
Foreign capital contributed in either portfolio or direct investments may be
unconditionally repatriated at any time. Foreign investors have the right to remit earnings
from their investments immediately, and registered foreign investors are allowed to use
export proceeds for remittance abroad in the event that domestic foreign exchange
controls go into effect that would otherwise restrict remittances. The federal government
may suspend the rights of foreign investors only during a designated foreign payments
emergency.
Reserved, Restricted, and Unrestricted Investment Activities Prior federal government
approval was necessary under the 1976 Foreign Investment Law for investment in sectors
such as defense, telecommunications, mass media, banking, publishing, insurance, and a
number of other industries. Recent changes have eased this requirement. There are no
special operating or performance requirements for foreign investors.

Barriers to entry may still exist in one form or another. Foreigners are barred from direct
investment in uranium mining or nuclear power generation as a matter of national
interest. Some restrictions also continue in mass media. Foreigners have reportedly been
denied broadcasting licenses, although their participation is not officially prohibited
either by law or government policy. Foreign investors may only enter the fishing and
insurance industries through purchase of a controlling interest in an existing Argentine
operation, as no new licenses are being issued in these sectors at this time. However,
unlimited entry will likely be permitted in the insurance industry subsequent to ongoing
restructuring and reform.
Investments in banking and related services are not restricted, but foreign participation
(ownership of local banks and the opening of branches or subsidiary operations of foreign
banks) must be approved by the Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (the central

bank, or BCRA). Such permission is decided on a case-by-case basis and depends on the
nature of the investment and the investor, and the situation in Argentina at the time of the
application.
Investments in non-mining activities in frontier areas require permission from the
National Superintendent of Frontiers, a part of the Ministry of Defense, although
investment in mining activities in these areas is unrestricted. The government is in the
process of modernizing federal mining codes, and provincial governments are actively
seeking to develop mineral resources in the western half of the country. Foreign investors
are being actively encouraged to participate in this development. Chilean companies have
already become heavily involved in mineral exploration in these areas.
Most of the past state monopolies --such as those that existed in communications, oil and
gas exploration and production, airlines, railways, port operations, and distribution of
water, power, and fight-were disbanded by the government's prior privatization efforts.
Foreign investors have been allowed to participate in privatization on an equal footing
with national bidders, and foreigners accounted for nearly 40 percent of such investment.
Special Considerations and Arrangements for Foreign Investors As is the case with any
foreign commitment, the investor should exercise extreme caution before proceeding
with the investment. This means acquiring extensive knowledge of all applicable rules,
regulations, and policies, as well as familiarity with the historic and current local market
situation. Detailed study of the country's markets may protect against costly errors that
could result from misunderstanding the foreign investment terms and conditions. In view
of the recent, rapid change in the economy's structure and in Argentine commercial codes
and rules regarding foreign participation, it is especially important for foreigners to
familiarize themselves with the current environment and local market players.
Although generally allowed to own real estate directly in most of Argentina, foreign
investors may face restrictions on land ownership near international borders (both land
and coastal borders). Ownership of this type of property is subject to the prior approval of
the Superintendent of Frontiers in the Ministry of Defense.

Investment Incentives
All formal investment incentive programs requiring direct federal budgetary expenditures
were suspended or eliminated by either the Economic Emergency Law of 1989 and the
Deregulation Decree of 1991. Now, foreign investment incentive policy is based on the
concept of national treatment towards foreign companies seeking establish operation
abroad.

8. REASONS FOR INVESTING IN ARGENTINA

Inferring from the detailed responses given by US firms with established operations in
Argentina in the survey (Please see Appendix D), it is evident that Argentina currently
possesses a very favorable environment in which to seek new business opportunities. In
comparison to its neighboring Mercosur countries, Argentina represents a new, reformed
and stable economic model that means "boundless opportunities for business growth for
American wishing to invest there." (Questionnaire respondent).

A. The investment environment in Argentina
1. Economic Fundamentals

Commitment to economic stability
After its experience with continuing inflation during the 1980's and especially after the
hyperinflationary peak of 1989, Argentine society established a serious commitment to
economic stability. As a result, people have been providing steady support for the strict
fiscal and monetary discipline upon which Argentina's economic policy is based.
American companies have recognized this grass roots commitment as a true guarantee of
economic stability in the long run.
Very low inflation
Companies based in developed countries are extremely cautious about inflation, so much
in fact, that it affects investment decisions in their own country. So it is no coincidence
that Argentina's foreign investment boom really began with the Convertibility Plan of
April in 1991 (a few months after Mercosur came into effect) and which dropped
inflation to record-low levels, going as low as 0.2% for the whole of 1996. This trend, as
can be seen in the following table, has been reinforced in recent months.

Table 13
ANNUAL INFLATION RATE, CONSUMER PRICES
YEAR

% INFLATION RATE

1989 (record high) 1086.60%
1990

950%

1991

84.50%

1992

17.50%

1993

7.40%

1994

3.60%

1995

1.60%

1996

0.20%

Source: Ministry of Economy, Public Works and Services 1997.

Table 14
ANNUAL INFLATION, 1996, SELECTED COUNTRIES
COUNTRY

INFLATION RATE %

Argentina

0.20%

Spain

3.40%

Korea

4.60%

Chile

7.90%

Greece

9.10%

China

9.90%

Brazil

20%

Mexico

43.80%

Venezuela

78.30%

Italy

4.50%

Source: The Economist, 1997.
Convertibility
US companies place great value on the guarantees that the Convertibility regime offers.
This scheme on the peso (Argentina's currency) being pegged and directly convertible to
the US dollar at a fixed rate of 1 peso = 1US$. By law, the Central Bank of Argentina
must sell dollars at this rate as demanded by the market, as well as fully back the
monetary base with international reserves. Bound by the Convertibility Law, all of these
rules are central to Argentina's economic policy and are applied rigorously. This system
provides companies with a series of guarantees that make Argentina one of the safest
places in the world to invest.
1. Fixed exchange rate: protects the value of investments and earnings
2. Backing with reserves: guarantees convertibility of pesos to dollars
3. Total freedom of exchange: allows remission of the total invested capital and
earnings at any moment.

4. Bi-monetary system: allows bank deposits, payments and contracts to be
carried out in dollars.
Monetary and fiscal discipline
US firms based in developed countries specifically value austerity in monetary and fiscal
matters. Within the framework of Convertibility, issuing money is limited to incoming
foreign reserves. Furthermore, management of government spending is quite rigorous.
Argentina is one of the few countries in the world which has kept its public sector
accounts under strict control during the last few years. (Baxter, 1997).

Figure 8
PRIMARY FISCAL RESULT WITHOUT CAPITAL RESOURCES
in % of GDP

Source: Ministry of Economy, Public Works and Services 1997.

B. A strong, dynamic market
The Argentine Market
Many US companies, especially those targeting consumer markets, have realized that by
investing in Argentina they gain direct access to 34 million consumers with a per capital
GDP of US$ 8,200, a mature and diversified market offering countless business
opportunities. Its dynamics are impressive: from 1990 to 1997, the GDP grew from US$
179 billion to US$ 319 billion. Projected estimates for the years 1998 and 1999
approximate US $344 billion and US$ 370 billion. (Please refer to Appendix A: Profile
on Argentina)
Mercosur
What is even more significant from the standpoint of US companies making huge
investments for large-scale production, like the automotive industry, is the fact that by

investing in Argentina, they gain access to Mercosur. This is the common market formed
by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. As mentioned previously, Mercosur has a
combined population of 200 million and a GDP of US$ 900 billion.

C. A pro-business environment
A favorable social environment
When referring to direct investments, especially those with long pay-back periods, it is
important to bear in mind their exposure to "political risk". US investors are very
susceptible to the social environment present in the host country. With regard to this,
Argentina is a democratic nation where people really believe in free enterprise.
Furthermore, there is a strong consensus about the need to maintain both monetary and
fiscal discipline. Besides, there are no ethnic or religious conflicts. The population,
mainly of Italian, Spanish and German descent and belonging to the middle class, have a
high level of education. (Diaz, 1996).
Minimal government intervention
The development of new business is greatly favored by freedom of action. Argentina is
one of the countries in the world with the least state interference over private enterprise.
(Mosbacher, 1997).
There is total freedom for setting process and wages. In fact, some regulations which
were still in place, especially in the areas of wholesale and retailing, foreign trade,
professional services, transportation, seaports, banking and insurance have been
eliminated. A system of competitive markets has been set up in previously state-owned or
highly regulated sectors such as electric power production and the oil industry. This has
exposed protected sectors to free markets, thereby lowering costs and generating new
business opportunities.
Privatizations
The privatization program initiated in 1990 gave tremendous impulse to foreign
investment, not only for its direct effects (US companies took great part in he bidding
process during privatizations), but also for the indirect effect resulting from Argentina
showing commitment with free enterprise. The bidding process itself, which demanded
competing consortia to have ample previous experience in their respective fields, made it
necessary for them to include US companies, being that local private firms lacked
expertise in privatized industries such as utilities and railways, which had been stateowned monopolies until then.
Among the privatized companies were airlines, the state telephone company, railroads,
electric power generation and distribution companies (including hydroelectric power
plants), the state oil company (YPF), oil fields, steel mills, seaports, radio and television

stations. By the end of 1996, the total value of privatized companies reached US $40
billion. (Fidler, 1997)
Taxing system
American companies pay particular attention to taxing systems, penalizing countries that
eat into their income with abusive taxes. Quite to the contrary, Argentina's taxing system
tends to burden consumption more than business earnings. Relatively low by
international standards, the tax rate for company profits is 30%.

D. A well-educated workforce
A tradition in education
Finding skilled labor, capable or working efficiently in an organizational and
technological environment similar to that of developed countries, is indispensable for an
American company's success in local operations. Given the national tradition of
investment in education going back into the last century, Argentina has an undisputed
edge over the rest of Latin America in this area. The literacy rate of the population over
10 years of age is of 96.3% and the enrollment rate at elementary schools is just short of
100%. (Diaz, 1996).
Argentina has one of the highest rates of university enrollment in the world.
Consequently, it is no surprise that labor is comparable in skills and aptitudes with that of
most developed countries, especially at technical and professional levels. With more than
2 million university graduated professionals, Argentina offers a large, well-educated and
skilled labor force. (Fidler, 1998)

Figure 9
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
per 100,000 inhabitants

Source: UNESCO -1996 Statistical Yearbook for Latin America

E. A vast supply of natural resources
The existence of an abundant supply of natural resources enables countless business
opportunities, based both on their direct exploitation as well as on the provision of goods
and services to these activities. Moreover, they are an especially valuable asset for
growth in the long run.
Oil and gas
Argentina is not only self-sufficient, but also exports oil and by-products such as fuel and
gas oil. Fuel exports climbed to US$ 1.6 billion in 1996, representing more than 10% of
the total value of exports. Current crude oil production is 40.2 million cubic meters a year
and detected reserves are ten times this level. Gas production is 27 billion cubic meters a
year and detected reserves are 20 times this level. (Baxter, 1997)
Hydroelectricity
With a 7.4 million kilowatt yield, Argentina's hydroelectricity plant represent 45% of the
electric power capacity of the country. During the next four years (1998-2001),
hydroelectric production capacity will increase by 30% due to the addition of new
generators at the major plant sites. (Madigan 1998).
Fertile lands and regional micro-climates
Within the 190,000 square kilometers of Argentine arable land, the world's, most fertile
farmland can be found. Stretching from semiarid regions to subtropical forests, the great
diversity of micro-climates and ecosystems enables the harvesting of a great variety of
crops. In addition, the low cost of land suitable for forestry and the high rate of forest
growth (surpassing the average in leading forestry countries), have resulted in significant
investments in this area.
Mining
Argentina is considered "the world's final mining frontier" (Diaz 1996). Its extensive
mineral deposits, located long the borders with Bolivia and Chile, have a geological
structure similar to that of these countries with long mining tradition. Since deregulation
and the opening of the sector to private companies along with the approval of the Mining
Investments Law in 1993, which provides fiscal stability for 30 years and a series of tax
exemptions, a number of large mining projects are underway. Most of these have been
taken on by foreign companies. Estimated investments for the next five years are in the
order of US$ 1 billion. (Baxter, 1997).
Fishing
With a 4,700 kilometer coastline, Argentina has an extensive maritime zone of exclusive
economic use. it is considered one of the best fishing areas in the world. Within it, an

abundance of valuable species can be found. Aide from local fishing fleets and through
established agreements, fleets from all over the world fish in Argentine waters. In 1996,
the total catch yielded 974,000 tons, of which 634,000 were for export. (Carlsson, 1997).

F. An attractive site for foreign investors
The current environment for US investments in Argentina is without a doubt one of the
most attractive in the world. (Hoke, 1997). The key elements in creating these favorable
conditions are:
Zero Bureaucracy: US companies do not need to register with the government in order
to operate in the country. Forming a company entails the same procedures regardless of
whether capital comes from a US investor or a local one.
National treatment principle: US companies receive the same treatment as local
companies. While in Argentina, they have open access to all economic sectors, including
those often reserved for local companies in other parts of the world, like
telecommunications, cable television, nuclear energy, airlines and defense industries.
Furthermore, US companies have equal access to incentive programs and contacts with
the government.
Free transfer of capital and earnings: At any time, foreign companies may transfer the
total amount of profits and of invested capital without any delay or quantitative
restriction.
Bi-monetary system: In Argentina, a peso-dollar bi-monetary system is in effect. Banks
accept deposits and checks in dollars and the law allows making contracts and payments
in foreign currency.
Quality of life for foreign/ US executives: Argentina's major cities are very safe by
international standards and enjoy a cosmopolitan atmosphere. They offer a great variety
of high quality cultural activities. International schools offering foreign curricula teach in
English, French, German, and Italian as well as in other languages.
A tradition in welcoming foreign companies: Although it is true that the current boom
of foreign direct investment projects originates in 1991 with the Convertibility Plan
(previously discussed), Argentina has maintained a friendly attitude towards foreign
companies throughout its history, especially American firms.

10. BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES FOR US FIRMS

Argentina ranks very high to many American businesses looking for new international
opportunities. It is the wealthiest nation in all of Latin America on a per capita basis. As
mentioned before, it has a very favorable environment characterized by economic
stability, liberalization of trade laws, the reduction of tariffs, the drastically reduction of
inflation rate, and a steady growing economy. (Campbell, 1997)
The vast opportunities exiting for American companies can be classified into the
following:
1. Export opportunities
2. Foreign investment opportunities through privatization
3. Public procurement opportunities

A. Export opportunities
Argentina demands a wider range of goods to meet business expansion and upgrades in
diverse sectors as well as the wants and needs of its consumers, particularly those of its
battered but recovering middle class, still the largest in Latin America. Since 1993, this
demand for USA made goods has leveled off somewhat following this initial boom
period, but a moderate to strong demand continues to exist virtually across the board for
capital, intermediate, and consumer goods.
In addition, even when domestic industries are filling most of the current demand in their
particular markets, they are increasingly relying on imported materials and components
from the United States, as well as on capital goods, creating additional markets for US
suppliers. And the overall demand for goods is expected to continue to be greater than the
country's ability to produce them for some time into the future. (Please refer to
Questionnaire Responses). A majority of the respondents listed this as a crucial reason for
new opportunities: the increased demand for goods and services that the domestic
production cannot serve due to lack of capacity.
The consumer demand can be broken down most easily into the different types of
products and industries as follows:
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Agriculture and food products: Although Argentina is one of the world's top food
exporters, there are a number of items the country is importing from the United States to
an even greater extent. These include prepackaged convenience foods --especially snack
foods-- and processed fruit and vegetables products. In 1996 the market for processed
fruit and vegetables reached US$ 2.2 billion (60% of which is was satisfied by US
production).(National Trade Data Bank, 1997)
Agricultural chemicals: Argentine demand for USA-made agricultural chemicals will
continue to grow because of the importance of the agricultural sector to the country's
economy and the shortfall in domestic productive capacity, which is unlikely to be

reversed in the short term. In particular, the need to improve yields through use of
fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides -which have been traditionally used sparingly in
Argentina -is expected to drive this market. The import market for these products was
about US$ 55 million in 1996 with an annual growth rate of 4% projected for the next
four years. Currently American firms cover approximately 55% of the market with other
major European chemical companies being the major competitors.(National Trade Data
Bank, 1997) Competition from local suppliers is only moderate, and trade barriers are
few. To date few international suppliers have developed a strong presence, so there is
ample room for new American suppliers to establish relationships.
Agricultural Equipment: Argentina's government realizes that it must make additional
investments in more and more sophisticated farm machinery to increase efficiency in its
agriculture sector, having invested little in this area in recent years. The government if
offering special lines of credit for agricultural producers and the level of investment if
expected to grow, especially for tractor and tillage equipment, and particularly for used
farm machinery that allows operation upgrades at a reduced cost. Modern agricultural
technology is also needed because some farmers are switching to less familiar crops
creating a new demand for USA made specialized equipment which currently dominate
in satisfying this new need.
Food processing and packaging equipment: The opening of the Argentine economy to
competition from overseas suppliers has created an opportunity for those American
companies who wish to export state-of-the-art processing equipment and other laborsaving devices to the Argentine agricultural sector. The 1996 market for such imports
rose by 15% from the previous year to US$ 120 million. ( National Trade Data Bank,
1997) The competition from local suppliers and other countries has been no more than
moderate and the trade barriers few, offering a great opportunity for US suppliers of
processing equipment for both traditional and nontraditional products and processes.

Table 15
AGRICULTURE ITEMS IN DEMAND
bailers, new and used
cold storage facilities
snack foods
cotton harvesters, gins and
modules
fertilizers
dairy products machinery
Source: National Trade Data Bank, 1997
AEROSPACE

fish processing machinery
meat processing machinery
mitecides
processed fruits and vegetables
insecticides
used tractors
planting seeds for fruit, vegetables,
and grain crops

The market for commercial aircraft in Argentina has begun to rebound after a decade of
stagnation. Airlines Argentines and Austral --the newly privatized national carriers-- are
updating their domestic fleets and are expected to begin investing in transcontinental
aircraft to upgrade their international service. As a result, this US$ 310 million annual
market is expected to expand considerably over the next several years. As the Argentine
economy recovers, the market will also improve for executive jets, turboprops, and
helicopters.
As Argentina moves to upgrade and modernize its air fleets to become internationally
competitive, the need to improve airport conditions is also growing. "Argentina is
seeking to upgrade its air transport infrastructure and modernize its navigation systems to
support the growth in air traffic and this has meant wonderful new business for us."
(Questionnaire respondent from Lockheed Aircraft).

International competition to service and supply the Argentine market is relatively heavy,
and trade barriers are few. Aggressive marketing and attractive financing are the inroads
into the Argentine air transport equipment markets.

Table 16
AEROSPACE ITEMS IN DEMAND

air traffic control radars
approach and landing aids
avionics
executive jets
helicopters
passenger aircraft
ground support equipment
Source: National Trade Data Bank, 1997
COMPUTERS AND SOFTWARE
In 1996 the total Argentine market for computers, peripherals, and software stood at
about US$ 500 million, and was growing at an annual rate of about 10% for software and
15% for hardware. Imports account for nearly 75% of the software and almost all -90%of hardware sales. Banks, other financial institutions such as insurance companies in
particular, and commercial firms have been the largest users of computer products, but
demand from utilities and heavy industry is growing as these sectors are privatized and
their operations are modernized and streamlined. "The market for our computer products

has increased dramatically in the last decade; the boom has been phenomenal for Unisys
and the opportunities are still growing at record speeds". (Questionnaire respondent)
Companies such as Unisys which offer a full service package, including hardware,
software, installation, training, and follow-up technical assistance, are likely to be most
successful. There is little competition from local suppliers, trade barriers are few, and
intellectual property protection and enforcement is improving.

Table 17
COMPUTER PRODUCTS IN DEMAND
hardware for local area networks (LAN servers)
word processing software
general business application software
laptop notebook computers
minicomputers
operating systems software
printers
personal computers
operating systems software
Source: National Trade Data Bank, 1997
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
The far-reaching overhaul of Argentina's retirement system and the resurgent
development of the mortgage lending sector is generating capital for new housing and
commercial developments. Environmental legislation is also playing a role in this market,
as industries revamp their facilities to comply with more stringent controls. In 1996 the
total market for such infrastructure was about US$ 750 million, with imports representing
only about US$ 85 billion.
Even though this market has been largely supplied by domestic producers within the past
decade, competition has been increasing for them especially regarding modern high-tech
materials. It is in these further developed materials that US companies have the greater
opportunity for market penetration. "The greatest area focus has been chemical additives
and prefabricated housing in the outer-city suburbs of Argentine's provinces."
(Questionnaire respondent from Lone Star Industries). Special items in great demand
include: fastening and power tools, concrete molds, chemical additives, and prefabricated
housing.

ELECTRICITY
The electric sector in Argentina has been privatized. Many of the power distribution
facilities are outdated and in need of repair. US corporations can take a role in generating,
distributing, and managing power operations and in providing equipment to upgrade
facilities. Although international competition is relatively stiff, there is only moderate
competition from local suppliers and few trade barriers. The market in the electric power
sector is projected to grow at an annual rate of 25% from 1996, opening new
opportunities through rapid expansion.

Table 18
ELECTRICITY ITEMS IN DEMAND
dry cells
electrical wires for low voltage distribution
fuses for low and medium voltage distribution
monitoring devices for electrical generation, transmission
and distribution
switch boxes for electrical consumption data control
transformers
Source: National Trade Data Bank, 1997
HOUSEWARES
As Argentina's middle class recovers and its buying power increases, so will the
opportunity to export many household items into the country. However, this is highly
competitive market. Due to the general need for housewares of virtually all categories
and all quality and price levels, and the recent reduction of import barriers, the
housewares sector has attracted numerous suppliers. But, new opportunities remain for
new American suppliers prepared to identify and serve market niches. Items in special
demand in this category include: cleaning supplies, appliances or "white goods",
silverware, tools, and glassware.

INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
Plastics processing machine and equipment: sectors generating the highest demand for
this include packaging, beverage bottling, and construction. This market currently
represents US$ 60 million. Competition is moderate from local suppliers, but intense
from international providers with barriers being very low. US companies are currently the
leaders with major European brands following.

Pollution control equipment: the need for these is growing as industry and government
become increasingly aware of environmental concerns. The major area is water quality
control, in which several new global companies have begun to compete for. The 1996
market was approximately US$ 5 million but is expected to grow by at least 10% per year
in the next four years. ( National Trade Data Bank, 1997)
Products in great demand include: bottling equipment, liquid industrial effluent treatment
plants for medium sized equipment, packaging equipment, water and sewage treatment
equipment.
MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT
Imports from medical equipment represented over US$ 350 million in 1996. The
estimated average annual growth rate in the market for the period 1994-1999 is 13%.
Competition from local suppliers is small, especially in high-technology equipment.
Presently, the United States is the number one supplier of both medical and scientific
equipment. However, there is a particular niche that has yet to be fully exploited: supply
of scientific equipment for agricultural and natural resources industries (specially oil)
which need advanced materials to remain competitive. The market in 1996 for such
equipment was US$ 8 billion, but is also expected to continue growing with emerging
areas opening for US suppliers.
Demand for these specific products exists and is increasing rapidly: prosthetics, lasers,
scanning microscopes, x-ray apparatus and tubes, pacing monitoring systems, quality
control instruments, and MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) equipment.

MOTOR VEHICLE AND VEHICLE PARTS
Strengthening the important automotive industry is still a high priority for the Argentine
government. recent relaxation of import restrictions have opened up the market for
automotive products from other countries, including replacement parts for these imported
vehicles. Although there is a large domestic auto parts industry, it is primarily designed to
serve the rather narrow range of domestically built models, leaving wide open the
provision of parts for imports. Not all imported parts are model-specific: spark plus,
gaskets, and diagnostic equipment for computer controlled fuel injection engines are
popular generic imports. In 1996 imports represented approximately US$ 760 million and
the estimated annual growth rate from the period 1996-2000 is 5% (National Trade Data
Bank)
OIL AND GAS FIELD MACHINERY
The privatization of the oil and gas industry has created opportunities for US suppliers of
field machinery. Private operators are now concerned with increasing both productivity
and corporate profits. Equipment needs to be upgraded to expand and increase capacity

and efficiency to meet the new standards imposed by international competition.
Competition from local suppliers is significantly low because local industry lacks the
capability to produce the more sophisticated equipment required. The market is growing
steadily having reached US$ 100 million in 1996. Items specifically needed include:
cementing equipment, compressors, control devices, meters, injection equipment,
pipeline equipment, and valves.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Currently, hundreds of telephone lines throughout Argentina are being modernized and
rehabilitated to provide an underlying infrastructure to support private investment in
equipment. Once the work on the lines is complete there will be a demand for high-tech
equipment and services as Argentine firms begin to upgrade their equipment with stateof-the-art telecommunication systems. Imports represent US$ 370 million but are
expected to increase dramatically by the end of the century. "Argentina represents an
amazing potential market for Nortel's services and products ...from fax machines, cellular
phones, and fiber optics ...to signal switches... the possibilities for expansion in the future
are immeasurable." (Questionnaire respondent from Nortel Telecommunications).
The cable and television market also represents significant export opportunities for
American firms. The existing network of 1,000 cable operators who have as subscription
of 4 million customers is expected to grow by twice fold in the next decade. (Hinkelman,
1996) Other areas opening up worth mentioning include: sporting goods, toys and
computer games, and electronics. However, in these sectors US companies face severe
competition from other firms especially from southeast Asia.

B. Foreign Investment Opportunities through Privatization
As mentioned previously, billions of dollars are being invested in a number of Argentine
enterprises that the state formerly owned and operated. In the oil, gas and electricity
sectors alone, about US$ 25 billion is expected to be spent in the next few years to
upgrade and expand privatized operations. About US$ 1 billion will be invested in water
and sewage programs. Several billion dollars will be spent to improve transportation
networks, ports, and telecommunication services.
The privatization process continues. Airports, seaports, three nuclear mint, and the
country's largest petrochemical plant are all scheduled to be privatized by the end of
1999. All of these privatizations will create opportunities for American investors who
wish to participate in auctions for the facilities and in the rebuilding and expansion of
these operations. Privatization projects exist in a number of sectors including electricity,
franchising, legal services, mining, oil and gas, tourism, telecommunications, power
generation, and transportation.

Table 19

MAJOR OPPORTUNITIES FOR US COMPANIES IN
PRIVATIZATION SECTORS
Source: Herrera-Vegas, 1996
Electricity

The privatization of the electric industry has created opportunities for foreign investment.
Demand for electricity continues to increase, and there is a concurrent need to upgrade
electrical generation, transmission and distribution facilities.
Franchising

Opportunities for franchising are now booming in a number of product areas. Both
foreign and domestic operations have opened franchises (restaurants, beauty stores,
sporting goods, etc.) Activities are set to double within next four years (1998-2001) to
US$ 550 million.
Legal services

A number of legal and consulting services are required for the many privatization
projects and the future demand will be for legal services dealing with corporate mergers,
international trade, capital markets, tax law, environmental regulation, and international
litigation. Even though foreign lawyers are not permitted to fully practice in Argentina,
there is a growing demand for outside legal consulting.
Mining

Investment in mining infrastructure or expansion of existing operation has increased due
to recent mining law and regulatory structure which provides numerous benefits.
Observers are forecasting strong growth in this sector of the economy and by the year
1999 it is estimated that mining production will double to account for 5% of GDP.
Oil and Gas

Investment opportunities exist in the establishment of plants to explore and develop oil
holdings throughout the country and to pump gas across wide areas in order to supply
domestic needs and the needs of bordering countries (i.e.: Chile)
Telecommunications

There are numerous opportunities for American investors in underwriting the installation
of large-scale telecommunication networks and the sale of smaller scale goods and
services to private consumers.

Other notable sectors include:
* Tourism: with opportunities for American investors in a wide range of areas: airport
services, camping sites, car rental services, catering services, credit lines for modernizing
hotels, and for extending the business of tour operators, convention centers cultural
centers, airlines, resorts, etc.
* Power Generation: through privatization projects involving major hydroelectric power
plants as well nuclear plants, the federal government has invited foreign investors to bid
as a concession for sale.
* Financial Sector: a number of Argentine provincial and municipal banks are to be
offered for privatization. Americans are being encouraged to invest in existing entities,
such as the public ones being offered.
Other smaller-scaled privatization efforts include petrochemicals and forestry
management enterprises.

C. Public Procurement Opportunities
The volume of public procurement has decreased in a number of areas since the
privatization of many of the country's state-owned companies took effect; in particular,
those that relate to oil, gas, certain transportation services, ports, and telecommunications
are now in private hands and are developing their own means of bidding and financing.
However, the government is still very much involved in the transition process and
although many purchases are not strictly "public procurement," they will certainly be
transacted, in some form or another, under the government's sponsorship or aid. In many
cases, the government's role has changed from owner of public services to regulator of
them, continuing to retain a certain degree of control over standards and procedures.
Some of the billions of dollars raised by the government during the privatization process,
much of which was spent to reduce the federal deficit, will also spent on future projects.

The government has established priority sectors for the investment of such public funds.
These include:
1. Social sectors of education, health care (especially for mothers and infants), and
water and sanitation services
2. Economic sectors that integrate education with industrial production, advance
scientific and technological research, rebuild transportation infrastructure,
increase environmental protection, and goods and services
3. Law enforcement and public safety
4. Governmental reform at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels.

A number of government-sponsored projects have recently been initiated in the areas of
computer systems, environmental protection, oil pipelines, roads, railways and
waterways, social infrastructure development, and decentralization and improvement of
secondary education. All of the mentioned undertakings represent wondrous
opportunities for American companies seeking to invest in growing Argentine operations.
(Campbell, 1997).
Whether it is in the area of exporting goods and services, directing foreign investment to
special projects by means of privatization, to public procurement incentives, the room for
continuous and sustained growth is unmeasurable. Argentina is in a critical period of its
long term economic recovery and the doors it has opened will benefit not only its current
conditions, but also enable US businesses to expand their operations to the country.
(Hinkelman, 1996)

11. SOCIAL IMPACT OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN
ARGENTINA
Never have things looked so good for Argentina, at least not since the 1930s, when it was
among the 15 richest nations in the world. Economic growth just hit 8% on annualized
basis for the second quarter running, fed by vast new investments in everything from auto
plants to vineyards. (Friedland, 1997). Inflation which soared unchecked for years, is
non-existent and government finances are in such good shape that Mr. Menem boasts that
this South American country meets the criteria for membership in the European Union
better than many EU members.
Yet, never has such a broad cross section of Argentines been so bitter about their
prospects. In recent weeks, they have taken to the streets and highways by the thousands
in protest, riled by an unemployment rate of 17.3% and lagging wages. Argentina's
economic restructuring has meant a heavy dose of harsh reality for its people and some
domestic industries. Privatization and system wide restructuring have inflicted casualties:
about 400,000 employees in what had been thought to be safe, private, and previously
sacrosanct government operations have lost their jobs, and the stark reality is that there as
yet simply no new jobs for many of these people in the new Argentine economy.
Although the privatization of big state enterprises over the past seven years has brought
the country needed technology, better service, and in may cases, lower prices for
everything from plane tickets to electricity, many Argentines are still opposed to the
government's policy of getting the state out of business. These concerns come against the
backdrop of a string economy, spurred in large part by the efficiencies unleashed when
the government sold off energy, telecommunications and transport.
What is not doing so well is domestic consumption due to the big side erect of Mr.
Menem's free market policies, that is unemployment. Particularly hard hit is Argentina's

once coddled middle class, which lost the patronage of what was once a benevolent, yet
bankrupt government. This temporary decline in the middle class spending means that
"Argentines are not appreciating the benefits of privatization".

In a recent poll conducted by Clarin (leading local newspaper) to 10,000 Argentines
across the classes the following results were given to the question: Do you believe the
latest privatization projects to be beneficial to the nation?

Figure 10
ARGENTINE OPINION POLL ON PRIVATIZATION

Source: Clarin Newspaper, 1997
Supporters of the structural economic reform argue that the gap between expectations and
the positive macro-economics numbers will close soon enough, turning Argentina into an
Asian-style exporting giant with rising wages and jobs for all. (Warn, 1997). But most
Argentines still hold values brought from Europe by their grandparents and parents,
values that were reinforced by the paternal promises of Juan Peron. General Peron, the
populist caudillo who ran Argentina from 1946 to 1955 and again briefly in the 1970s,
created an all embracing partnership between unions and the state, in which political
support was traded for extraordinary benefits.
However, most Argentines do not want to live in a place like South Korea or Thailand.
They want to live somewhere like the Netherlands, where the state puts emphasis not just
on global competitiveness, but on the welfare of the people. The clash between these two
visions, aggravated by widening income inequality and the conspicuous consumption of
the wealthy is becoming more acute by the day. This is the crux of the issues facing this
resource-rich nation of 33 million. Although Argentines got used to the European-style
safety net woven together by General Peron and those who followed him, by the 1980s a
vast and inefficient state had bankrupted the country. It is no time for them to realize the
short-term sacrifices will create long-term growth and recovery for the future generation
of Argentines. (Friedland, 1997). Future decline in the unemployment rate is visible as
sustained GDP growth is sought to bring jobs well into the year 2000 (as a result of a
projected unemployment rate of approximately 10%. (Fidler, 1997)

Figure 11
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

Source: Fidler, 1997
Opinion polls show that voters believe corruption is Argentina's second largest problem
after unemployment. But much corruption is small scale, typically involving a junior
official or employee who requests a small payment or favor for easing the path of a
negotiation. According to Argentine popular opinion, government is smaller, thanks to
privatization, but it is not yet obvious that private sector behavior has improved. Indeed
many people still feel business practices among many companies to be questionable.
(Fidler, 1997).
In another recent survey a group of 4000 individuals ranging from college students and
professors, to business executives and nurses were asked to define the issue of corruption
in Argentina today. They were asked: "Would you say corruption is a very, somewhat or
not a serious matter at all?

Figure 12
CORRUPTION IN THE MINDS OF THE ARGENTINE

Source: Clarin Newspaper, 1997
Clearly, the issue of corruption is not as urgent as that of unemployment. A large number
of Argentine believe that current corruption in not a serious problem at all. This may very
well be the case if one looks back at past figures and corruption evidence. Without a
doubt, corruptive activity has subsided somewhat due to stricter control and decreasing
inefficiencies in government enterprises. This is evident in the results presented in the
survey above. There is also a greater perceived sense of national credibility as a result of
less major corruption.
Adding to Argentina's international credibility are its increasingly solid trade ties.
Together with Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, it has formed the South Cone common
market or "Merco" as most Argentine refer to it. It is with great optimism that a great
majority unite to support the achievements and long term goals of Mercosur. There is no
other existing subject within Argentina in which all people agree with the most. No
matter what class, educational attainment, profession or age, Argentines are supportive in
voicing their positive opinions regarding the regional agreement. (The Economist, 1997)
There appears to be a consensus regarding Mercosur's "more than favorable" influence on
Argentina as a whole. (Warn, 1998). Among the most popular reasons included are that:
Mercosur has become a powerful presence in the negotiations for a free trade area
covering all of the Americas by 2005 and its increased active role in world trade stage
enabling Argentina to be seen by the rest of the world. Other reasons mentioned are the
eventual transfer of all factors of production allowing people from the member nations to
move across the borders (culture attainment, educational and labor transfer) with no
difficulty whatsoever and the increased "bargaining power" of the larger market in terms
of global trade and investment.

Figure 13
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Source: Warn, 1998
Argentines seem to be very optimistic about the country's membership into the South
Common Market, however they are more concerned about their domestic and internal
climate and the immediate improvements needed in the area of unemployment, welfare,
inter-political battles, and the temporary erosion of the middle class.
However, there is an inevitable chance that Argentina's reforms will continue because the
old solutions have been shown to be unworkable and there are enough politicians
committed to the new ideas, enough personnel capable of administering them, and,
perhaps most compelling of all, fresh memories of afar worse past that should help both
the public and the government to keep each other on a steady course.

12. CRITICISMS ON MERCOSUR
Ever since Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay formed the Mercosur customs union
in 1991, free-trade supporters have worried about whether the Southern Cone might
become a protectionist fortress. This fear has been further fueled by a recent World Bank
study by Alexander Yeats, principal economist for the bank's International Trade
Division, contending that a significant amount of the increased trade within Mercosur is a
result of trade diverted from more efficient non-Mercosur producers to less-efficient
producers within the bloc. (Hudgins, 1997).
If true, this would be bad news. The region is in desperate need of greater market
openness; a Mercosur fortress would lead to a less competitive region. But such a
conclusion is far from certain. In order to judge Mr. Yeat's work, it is first necessary to
establish the criteria by which to judge any trade policy. As a rule of thumb, governments
should take every opportunity to open markets. Trade barriers restrict the freedom of
individuals to exchange their own property with citizens of other countries. tariffs are
taxes that punish individuals for making choices of which their governments disapprove.
Further, economic liberty is the only known path to growing productivity, prosperity and
good-paying jobs. Thus all trade liberalization, like all tax cuts should be applauded.
Critics of Mercosur must show that it is a faux free-trade zone that reduces net liberty by
increasing the cost of importing goods from other countries, and thus harms consumers
within Mercosur. Mr. Yeats certainly does not succeed in doing this.
Mr. Yeats's study shows that Mercosur exports have grown to $61.89 billion in 1994
from an annual average of $34 billion for the 1984-86 period. But he observes that a
greater share of these exports is between Mercosur countries, 19.5% now compared to
6.7% in the mid-1980s. America and Western Europe have become less important
destinations. But Mr. Yeats ignores other reasons for shifting exports. For example,

communism's fall in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s no doubt has meant Western
Europe turns more to those markets for trade. (Nogues, 1997)

Significantly, total imports into Mercosur jumped to $78 billion in 1995 from around $29
billion in 1990. Purchases from the U. S. grew to $17 billion in 1995 from $6.68 billion
in 1990. This is not surprising, since the Mercosur countries have been reducing trade
barriers to nonmember countries as part of their World Trade Organization commitments.
This import surge certainly does not suggest a Fortress Mercosur in formation. (Devlin,
1997).
Mr. Yeats goes on to offer a calculation of trade intensity he says will "highlight the
relative importance of (seemingly minor) changes in trade between countries that have
relatively small global trade shares." He looks at the variation from expected bilateral
trade patterns based on a trading partner's share of world trade. But the fact that a
statistical microscope is needed to make such variations visible suggests that they are of
little policy importance.
A seemingly more plausible concern is raised by Mr. Yeats's calculation of expected
exports by Mercosur countries in light of their comparative advantages. For example,
auto manufacturing is one of Brazil's largest industries. If that sector were growing more
competitive, would one not expect its exports to take a greater share of both Mercosur
and non-Mercosur markets? Mr. Yeats finds that in this key, capital-intensive sector,
Brazil is not penetrating third markets. But it will require time and tough marketing for
Brazilian cars to take market share away from American- and Japanese-made vehicles. In
any case, customer choices, not mathematical calculations of theoretical comparative
advantage, determine the "correct" share of a market.
The Mercosur auto story is more complex than can be encompassed in a single
calculation. In the early 1990s Mercosur countries reduced tariffs on autos to 20% from
as much as 100%. As auto imports into Mercosur surged, Brazilian auto manufacturers
screamed that they would collapse without special protection. Brazil's government
restored high tariffs and other restrictions, giving the industry three years to adjust to
competition. This was unsound policy. It resembles America's restrictions on Japanese
imports in the 1980s. It limits the freedom of Brazilians to purchase foreign-made cars,
though possibly no more than the situation before the creation of Mercosur. But it does
not suggest a developing Fortress Mercosur. The reaction of Brazil's Mercosur partners to
this auto arrangement perhaps is most instructive concerning the virtues and dynamics of
regional agreements. These partners, angered by Brazil's move, did not follow its lead.
Argentina kept its tariffs on autos low, guaranteeing its consumers greater access to
vehicles from non-Brazilian suppliers. And its Mercosur partners will keep the pressure
on Brazil to end its protectionism in three years, as it has promised.
What, then, are the lessons of this flap over Mercosur? First, regional trade agreements
by definition give preferential treatment to suppliers in member countries and probably

cause some trade diversion. But as long as no new barriers are erected to nonmember
countries, there is no loss of freedom to citizens in the member countries. Yes, it would
be better if each country eliminated its barriers to all other countries. But since that's not
politically possible, countries should establish free trade where they can and fight the
next battles for open markets where the opportunities arise.
Second, statistics should not set off panics about inappropriate policies. For example, Mr.
Yeats observes that the spreads in tariff rates between Mercosur countries and
nonmembers are far higher than the spreads created by other regional arrangements, such
as NAFTA and the European Union. But Mercosur countries began with some of the
world's highest tariff rates. The spreads are not a result of new trade barriers. Mr. Yeats's
insight, if true, suggests no policy action.
Increased economic liberty should be the primary goal of trade policy. If Mercosur
countries create a customs union by raising trade barriers to nonmembers, then citizens of
member countries could have freedom restored with one hand and stolen with the other.
Import substitution by any other name still would be a failure. Mercosur needs open
markets to provide the consumer goods that are incentives for workers to be productive,
the inputs for enterprises, and the competition to force enterprises to become efficient.
And Mercosur countries need to continue to deregulate their domestic markets. They
should avoid policy harmonization that preserves government control of economies and
leads to the kind of stagnation experienced now by the EU.
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